Consumer issues, Governance, infrastructure

LRT-2’s decline amid funds misuse and dubious deals

LRTA misused LRT-2 rehab funds

Presidential mouthpiece Salvador Panelo called the challenge to commute. The dare arose from his callous remark about the state of the metro’s transport system. There’s no crisis he said, since people are still able to go wherever they need to. Enduring the daily torment of long queues and endless waits, overcrowding and hellish traffic, the commuting public are of course outraged.

But Panelo’s four-hour, four-jeepney commute circus should not distract us from the fundamental issues. The ordinary working class and students who bear the torture of commuting do not need him to validate what they suffer every day.

Recurrent mishaps

The crisis in the mass transport system is not only real. It is chronic and structural. It did not start when the LRT-2 suspended its operations as the usual glitches hampered the LRT-1 and MRT-3. For as long as we can remember, one or two of Metro Manila’s rail lines break down on an almost weekly basis.

To be sure, the Duterte administration is not solely to blame for the recurrent glitches, passenger offloading and shutdowns of Metro Manila’s rail system. Such decrepit state of the rail system was spawned by decades of accumulated wrong government policies, neglect and corruption. Technical glitches number to thousands per year, according to transport officials.

These train malfunctions started to occur with increasing frequency under the previous administrations of Arroyo and Aquino, and the crisis continues its cumulative deterioration under Duterte. Prior to these recent incidents, LRT-2 is not as notorious as LRT-1 and more especially MRT-3 in terms of service interruptions.

LRT-2 had several mishaps prior to the October 4 fire that brought its entire line to a halt for several days. Last May 18, two of its trains collided and injured 34 people. It was perhaps the second worst accident involving metro rails, just behind the wayward MRT-3 train that rammed through a station and hurt 38 people back in 2014.

The LRT-2 collision happened two days after a lightning hit the train line’s overhead power connection. Unable to operate, the incident stranded thousands of LRT-2 commuters in the middle of a thunderstorm. On June 7, LRT-2 also suspended its operations due to a technical malfunction.

Declining performance

It seemed that the recent major breakdown of the LRT-2, which will take a possible six to nine months to be fully restored, was bound to happen. This noticeable increased frequency in its system’s malfunctions is affirmed by the rail line’s declining performance indicators. From an average of 11 trainsets running during peak hours in 2014 and 2015, the number fell to 10 in 2016 and 2017, and further to just 8 in 2018 and 7 trainsets in 2019.

Passenger traffic has also substantially decreased – from 72.85 million in 2014, the number fell to 62.21 million in 2015. After recovering to 67 million in 2016, passenger traffic in LRT-2 progressively declined to 65.96 million in 2017 and 64.70 million in 2018. Its passenger traffic in the first five months of 2019 is also the lowest in the last six years.

LRT-2’s farebox ratio – or the proportion of fare revenues to total operation and maintenance (O&M) costs – is falling as well. A farebox ratio of 1.00 means that fare revenues cover 100% of O&M cost.  From an upward trend of 1.00, 1.44 and 1.53 in 2014, 2015 and 2016, respectively, the farebox ratio of LRT-2 has gone down continuously to 1.06, 0.93 and 0.81 in 2017, 2018 and 2019 (first five months), respectively.

Actual gross revenues collected from LRT-2, after increasing from Php973.36 million in 2014 to Php1.25 billion in 2015 (the year when fares were substantially hiked) and further to Php1.31 billion in 2016, declined to Php1.27 billion in 2017 and Php1.24 billion in 2018. Comparing similar periods, collected gross revenues in the first five months of 2019 (Php485.59 million) are also the lowest since 2014.

Falling farebox ratio is the result of declining passenger traffic which results to lower fare revenues, and higher O&M costs due to, among others, poor service maintenance of the system. Poor maintenance leads to less trainsets running and less revenues earned. It is a cycle that could be ended through efficiency in management and maintenance of the system.

Misusing rehab funds

Alas, the train line operated by the Light Rail Transport Authority (LRTA) has been obviously poorly managed and maintained.

One reason is that already limited public resources allocated for the system’s improvement are not properly being used. In its 2018 audit report on the LRTA, the Commission on Audit (COA) said that a portion of state subsidy for the rehabilitation of LRT-2 as well as for general administration and support “was not utilized in accordance with its intended purpose”.

Through a Special Allotment Release Order (SARO) on June 17, 2016, the LRTA received Php743.56 million from the national government. However, state auditors found out almost half of that amount – Php360 million – was transferred to LRTA accounts not related to the purpose of the SARO (i.e., LRT-2 rehabilitation and administration and support).

“Questionable and doubtful”, according to COA, was the transfer of Php210 million in rehabilitation and restoration funds of LRT-2 to fill the liabilities of the LRTA in a bank account held in trust for bid documents, bonds and retention.

Likewise, state auditors noted the transfer of Php150 million in LRT-2 rehabilitation and restoration funds to a savings account that holds LRTA’s revenues from magnetic ticket sales. It was used as partial payment, interest charges and taxes for an outstanding loan arising from the services rendered by a private contractor with LRT-1.

In its report, released just last June 2019, COA asked the LRTA management to “discontinue using the subsidy funds earmarked for specific purposes and strictly comply with EO (Executive Order) 292 on the use of subsidy fund”. EO 292 refers to the Administrative Code of 1987.

COA also told the government rail agency to “replace the amount taken from the subsidy fund of Rehabilitation of LRT Line 2 System and General Administration and Support”. Further, state auditors asked the LRTA management to submit an explanation on the questionable transfer of Php210 million to bank accounts not meant for LRT-2 rehabilitation.

Dubious deals

Not only is the LRTA mismanaging the funds intended to improve the condition of and services provided by the LRT-2 system. It also continues to make deals with long-time LRTA private contractors that have a questionable track record.

The current maintenance provider for LRT-2 is the AMSCO joint venture composed of APT Global Inc., MultiScan Corporation, and Opus Land, Inc., with the LRTA awarding a Php1.81-billion contract last December 2018.

APT Global has figured in several cases of problematic contracts involving Metro Manila’s rail systems. As the MRT-3 maintenance provider, APT Global was ordered by the COA in 2015 to pay Php211 million for failing to deliver its contractual obligations. Among others, they included failure to deliver trains, defective escalators and elevators and half line operations.

APT Global was also part of the TSPA joint venture (along with Telefonika, STIV and Pacific) that maintained LRT-2 from June 2007 to June 2012. In its 2016 Special Audit Report on the LRTA, COA said that TSPA committed a minimum of 16 trainsets running on LRT-2 but only delivered 13 trainsets. Despite this, LRTA still paid its contract with TSPA in full, worth almost Php1.06 billion, instead of making the necessary cost reduction.

With such an undesirable track record, it is perplexing how APT Global was still able to be part of a joint venture that currently maintains the LRT-2. Apparently, it is one of the favored contractors by those in the LRTA.

The bidding conducted by the LRTA for the procurement for maintenance of the LRT-2 system won by APT Global’s joint venture AMSCO was allegedly fraught with irregularities. Commuter groups RILES Network and United Filipino Consumers and Commuters filed a case before the Ombdusman against LRTA officials last April 2019.

They alleged, among others, that the LRTA designed the bidding process in a way that ensures only AMSCO will bag the contract. It included requiring the use of spare parts that AMSCO’s MultiScan is the exclusive distributor of in the Philippines. Like APT Global, MultiScan is a longtime contractor of LRTA as a supplier of spare parts and consumables of the LRT-2 system in the past two decades.

The real challenge

In other words, the hundreds of thousands of LRT-2 commuters affected by the shutdown are at the mercy of, to the say the least, an inefficient government agency and its inept private contractors that profit millions of pesos in taxpayers’ and commuters’ money.

With the kind of track record that those handling the LRT-2 have, no wonder that the rail system broke down the way it did. It is also not surprising that the damages caused by the fire could supposedly take months to repair, aggravating the already unbearable state of public commute in Metro Manila.

The public sector should continue to operate the LRT-2 as a provider of a vital public service. The transportation department’s plan to privatize its operation and maintenance will only worsen the woes of commuters and further drain public resources as evidenced by our experience in LRT-1 and MRT-3.

But obviously, the current LRTA has been mismanaging the LRT-2 system. Reforms must be put in place to address this, including structural changes that would allow greater public scrutiny of and participation in the rail agency’s operations. Private contractors that have repeatedly failed to deliver should be banned and held to account. Using the crisis to justify the failed and flawed privatization must be opposed.

These are actually small reforms compared to the massive extent of Metro Manila’s transport crisis, but necessary reforms nonetheless to ensure that the LRT-2 becomes a truly publicly run rail system meant to serve the commuters’ interests and welfare.

Is the Duterte administration capable of instituting these reforms to start addressing the crisis? That’s the real challenge to Panelo and his boss. ###

Privatization, SONA 2014

How Aquino betrayed public interest in LRT 1 privatization

Photo from

Photo from

Read the first part – How MVP-Ayala will squeeze LRT 1 commuters dry

In forging the Concession Agreement with the MVP-Ayala group, President Aquino has betrayed the public interest and welfare and has put government in a patently disadvantageous position.

While DOTC officials claim that the MVP-Ayala group submitted a negative bid of P9.5 billion – meaning they will pay government such amount to do the project – it is the commuters who will ultimately bear the burden as the concessionaire will recover the money from the riding public through higher fares as I explained in the previous post.

Furthermore, the P9.5 billion will also be offset by the numerous perks that the MVP-Ayala group will enjoy under the Concession Agreement such as the P5-billion government subsidy as project startup and government assumption of payment of real property taxes (estimated at P64 billion!)

Why is the Concession Agreement designed so favorably for the MVP-Ayala group? The idea behind PPP/privatization is to create the most conducive environment for private business. And to ensure that, the private investors will utilise all their connections and resources. The Ayala family, of course, has long been a political ally and crony of the Aquino family while there are claims that DOTC Undersecretary Rene Limcaoco, who was among those who pushed for LRT 1 privatization, is related to top Ayala executive Jose Teodoro Limcaoco.

Anyway, with its permission, I am posting in full the position paper prepared by the Alliance against LRT Privatization which discussed the different issues related to the takeover by the MVP-Ayala group, including the onerous terms of the Concession Agreement and the displacement of hundreds of LRT 1 employees.

Position Paper on the Privatization of the LRT1 Operations and Maintenance and the Implementation of the LRT Line 1 Extension PPP project

The Alliance Against LRT Privatization (AALP) opposes the privatization of the LRT1 Operations and Maintenance and the Public Private Partnership program for the construction the LRT1 Cavite Extension. The project is grossly disadvantageous to the riding public, the government and the employees of LRTA.

Why PPP?

The government’s privatization program dubbed Public Private Partnership has been touted as the solution to the lack of services and infrastructure plaguing the government. Under this scheme, private investors will supposedly bring in investments that will benefit the people, thus easing the financial burden on government.

As stated in its PPP brochure, “the PPP seeks to encourage greater participation of the private sector in the provision of basic public infrastructure through investments, construction, and operation and management programs. The program intends to provide the public with adequate, safe, efficient, reliable, and reasonably-priced infrastructure and development facilities while affording the private sector a level playing field, reasonable returns and appropriate sharing of risks. Government sees this as a reliable and solid strategy to efficiently deliver its services, create more job opportunities through a dynamic and solid infrastructure program.”

But beyond the rhetoric is the grim reality that the government, in adopting the PPP scheme, is essentially abandoning its role in the development of the country, leaving it instead to the hands of private investors. Government refuses to learn from the bitter lessons of earlier privatization schemes that have raised the fees for services, increased government debt and resulted in mass retrenchment of state workers

Attracting investors via “sweeteners”

In the early phase of the PPP Program, the Aquino government has vowed not to employ “sweeteners,” purportedly to avoid pitfalls besieging PPP predecessors such as, among others, the Build-Operate-Transfer (BOT) Scheme employed in the privatization of the National Power Corporation (NPC), and the Build-Lease-Transfer (BLT) Scheme of the MRT3, that consequently increased government’s debt burden due to sovereign guarantees given to entice private sector participation (PSP).

However, the privatization of the Operations and Maintenance of the entire LRT1 has served as a sweetener to the LRT1 Cavite Extension Project. While the winning bidder is in the process of constructing the extension from Baclaran Station to Niyog, Bacoor, Cavite, the national government has offered the private concessionaire the operations and maintenance of the entire LRT1 system, from Roosevelt Station to the Baclaran Station.

Currently, the profitability of the entire LRT1 system has been maintained after the national government took over the operation and maintenance of the entire system from the private sector, specifically, Metro, Inc. a subsidiary of the Meralco Corp. in 1999.

Based on its 2013 financial statements, the LRTA has earned a gross revenue of PhP 2.5 Billion from its LRT1 operations. Prudent spending and high public patronage has enabled the LRTA to achieve a 1.26 farebox ratio, one of the highest in the international rail community. Farebox ratio is the fraction of operational expenses, which are met by the fare paid by the passengers. It is computed by dividing the gross revenue by the total operating expenses.  LRT1’s high farebox ratio signifies that rail revenues generated, excluding non-rail income (from advertising, lease, etc.), were more than enough to cover the operating expenses for the year with extra funds for other expenditures (e.g. subsidy for LRT2 operations). In the present set-up, where the LRTA operates and maintains LRT1, the working capital is not subsidized by the government.

The privatization of the operations of an entirely profitable system will ensure another source of profit to the winning bidder in the Line Extension. We should question whether the profits earned from the operations of LRT 1 would be the source of the investments for the Line 1 Extension.

Disadvantageous to the government and commuters

To attract investors, government assumed even more financial risks while passing on increased financial burdens on the consumers.

  1. Government assumes payment of Real Property Taxes. On November 21, 2013, the NEDA revised the terms of the Cavite Extension Project to conform to the demands of the bidders, including the payment of Real Property Taxes (RPT) to be shouldered by the national government. This means government will pay around PhP 64 Billion for the entire 32-year contract period. This will only result to more debt burdens for the government.
  2. Fares will increase as a result of privatization. The government agreed to a  5% fare increase upon project completion, The government is also keen on implementing the new distanced-based fare adjustment that has been stalled since 2011 due to public opposition. At the earliest, the DOTC hopes to increase fares by August 2014 prior to the target effectivity of the Concession Agreement on September 2014. This will ensure higher profitability for the Concessionaire, as well as higher base fare for any future fare adjustments it will require upon project completion.
  3. Government guarantees automatic fare adjustments as well as fare hikes based on inflation. Not only is the Concessionaire allowed a 5% fare increase upon project completion, the government, based on the Concession Agreement, also allows for succeeding adjustments of the Notional Fare:
    • “The Notional Fare shall be adjusted on August 1, 2016 and every second anniversary thereafter (Notional Fare Setting Date) by an effective rate of 5% per annum or 10.25% per adjustment (Schedule 9, Part 1B: Financial Matters, page 173, Schedules, CA).”
    • “The Concessionaire or the Grantor may request that the Notional Fare be examined every 4 years from the first Notional Fare Setting Date and may be adjusted to reflect movements in inflation (Inflation Rebasing), on a Notional Fare Setting Date, where the first Inflation Rebasing may be implemented on August 1, 2018…(Schedule 9, Part 1D: Financial Matters, page 175, Schedules, CA).”
  4. Private concessionaries will pass on VAT to commuters. If a Sales Tax or Value Added Tax (VAT) is levied on the fares, the government allows the Concessionaire to pass this cost as part of the fare collected from the passengers of LRT1 (Schedule 9, Part 1E: Financial Matters, page 177, Schedules, CA).
  5. Changes in power rates will be passed on to commuters. The government agreed to a Differential Generation Cost (DGC) adjustment under the Concession Agreement (Schedule 9, Part 3: Differential Generation Cost, pp. 183-187, Schedules, CA). The DGC mechanism “is intended to take into account extreme fluctuations in generation costs, which comprises the largest component of power cost for the system, and allows upward adjustments to the Notional Fare and Approved Fares.” Under this scheme, the Concessionaire “shall be compensated for the DGC through fare adjustments…in relation to purchase of electric power from Meralco

With all these assurances from government, privatization removes from the private Concessionaire any financial liability and business risk, transferring instead all risks and liabilities to the government and the commuters.

The hybrid PPP mode itself is very lopsided and biased against the government. It is essentially called a hybrid PPP variant because if a project is more than PhP 60 Billion, half the cost is supposedly shouldered by the government through Official Development Assitance (ODA).

But under the LRT1 Cavite Extension Project, it is the government that will be shouldering the lion’s share of the cost of the project. Of the PhP 64.9 Billion total project cost, the private sector will shoulder PhP 30B for the civil works, electro-mechanical systems and other components of the viaduct, trackworks, stations and facilities, and the operations and maintenance. On the other hand, government will shoulder PhP 34.9 Billion of the cost for Right of Way Acquisition, Purchase of Coaches, Civil Works for the upgrading of the existing Depot and construction of the Satellite Depot.  On top of these expenditures, government will also shoulder the roughly PhP 64 Billion payment for Real Property Taxes.

Displacement of Workers

In the privatization of the LRT1 Operations and Maintenance, around 964 Contractual Employees of the LRTA are to be hired by the Concessionaire subject to a probationary period of 6 months, in which the Labor Code provisions, no longer the Civil Service provisions, shall govern. Some of these Transferring Employees have been with the LRTA for almost 15 years when the LRTA took over from the Metro, Inc. and would have been eligible for old age pension under the GSIS Law by 2015 or after 15 years of government service.

Within 3 months, the Concessionaire shall conduct an assessment of the transferred employees and determine who shall continue to be employed by the Concessionaire after the lapse of the 6 months period. After the lapse of the 6 months period, “if the Concessionaire wishes to dismiss any employee due to Economic Causes (e.g. installation of labor-saving devices and/or redundancy), then the Concessionaire may do so in accordance with relevant rules and procedures (Section 6.3, page 58, CA).

The privatization of the Automated Fare Collection System this year has clearly provided the LRT1 Concessionaire with the “economic cause” to terminate employees after the lapse of the probationary period. Conservatively, only around 241 or a fourth of the transferred employees will remain with the Concessionaire, possibly to be sub-contracted.

Hence, contrary to the government spin that the PPP program will create more job opportunities, it will in effect displace workers, after the 6 months probationary period.

Horrors of Past Private Sector Partnerships

From the current provisions of the Concession Agreement and the TOR for the PPP Project, it seems that the government has once again refused to learn from its past failures in privatization.

The previous BLT and BOT schemes indeed delivered the required infrastructures for the public but with horrific consequences for the government and the people in general. The Privatization of the MWSS has resulted to periodic increases in the cost of water, now totaling nearly 400%. The privatization of the assets of the National Power Corporation has placed power generation in the hands of big business and has increased power rates by a 100% from the time EPIRA was enacted.

Closer to the LRT1 scenario is the MRT3 experience, which invariably had the most lopsided risk allocation profile against the government. At first the government promised no state subsidy, but with 8 revisions to the Concession Agreement, government assumed the financing for the Right of Way Acquisition, and up to now has been assuming the traffic risks, and extended loan guarantees. Government allocates some P7 billion a year to pay for the financial obligations of the MRT arising from the lopsided contract. The government is now trying to buy back MRT3 from the MRTC.

What the government seems to forget is the basic dynamics between the government and the public sector for past PPP or BOT project implementations. The PPP or BOT projects revolve around financial viability for the private sector and economic viability for the public sector. Both sectors have varying objectives: for the government, it is to implement the project, while for the private sector, the objective is to maximize the Return of Investment (ROI), which can only occur by increasing the cost of the project assumed by the public sector or increasing support from the government either in terms of tax breaks, credit enhancements, subsidies, and the like, or reducing risks.

To expose vital government infrastructures to the desire of the private sector to maximize profits is to expose the government to more risks, instead of benefits. The past has proven that the benefits have far outweighed the benefits derived.

What is also frightening is the power wielded by the winning bidder. The Ayala-Metro Pacific (MVP) consortium would eventually control Line 1 operations, the Automated Fare Collection System, and the construction of the Line 1 extension. Metro Pacific also controls part of the MRT 3. This is a virtual monopoly in the train line which will remove any possible checks and balances regarding its performance and give them tremendous control to dictate fares.

Call to action

We, the Alliance Against LRT Privatization, a network of concerned individuals, employees and commuters, call on the people to reject the privatization of the LRT Line 1 Operations and Maintenance and the hybrid PPP mode of implementation of the LRT1 Cavite Extension Project.

We call on Congress to conduct an inquiry on the present state of the LRT Line Systems, amend the Procurement Law to fast track the procurement of vital capital spare parts and arrest the downgrading of the LRT systems and facilities, and to increase the capitalization of the LRTA from the current PhP3 Billion to PhP300 Billion.

Finally, we call on the people to resist the on-going privatization of vital government services to the detriment of greater access of these services for the people.###

Privatization, SONA 2014

How MVP-Ayala will squeeze LRT 1 commuters dry

Fare hikes galore as the MVP-Ayala group takes over the LRT 1

Fare hikes galore as the MVP-Ayala group takes over the LRT 1 (Photo from

A fare hike after the presidential State of the Nation Address (Sona) and massive retrenchment of LRT 1 employees by early next year are among the immediate impacts of the Php64.9-billion LRT 1 extension and privatization project.

As the lone bidder in the largest public-private partnership (PPP) deal of the Aquino administration, the group led by Metro Pacific Investments Corp. (MPIC) of Manny Pangilinan (MVP)/Salim Group (Indonesia) and Ayala Corp. of the Ayala family, a long-time crony of the Aquinos, is now all set to take over the operation of the country’s first-ever metropolitan rail system from the Light Rail Transit Authority (LRTA).

MPIC (55%) and Ayala (35%), together with Australia-based investment giant Macquaire (10%) have formed the Light Rail Manila Consortium to extend the LRT 1 from its current endpoint in Baclaran to Niyog in Bacoor, Cavite.

I was able to obtain a copy of the final Concession Agreement and its Annexes/Schedules. You may download the Concession Agreement here. As for the Schedules, contact me through the comment section below to get a copy. The files are too big and it takes time to upload everything.

(You may now access all the documents here.)

Based on the Concession Agreement and Schedules, the concessionaires will implement an initial Notional Fare composed of P12.13 in boarding fare plus P1.10 per kilometer (distance fare component) starting on August 1, 2014. Notional fare refers to the fare that the concessionaire is entitled to under the Concession Agreement.

This means that a commuter travelling from Roosevelt to Baclaran will pay a new fare of more than P32 – representing the P12.13 in boarding fare plus a distance fare of P19.88 (P1.10 x 18.07 kilometers or the distance between the Roosevelt and Baclaran stations). That’s P12 more or 60% higher than the current fare. (See Table)

Old fares vs. new fares under LRT 1 privatization (Figures in pesos unless stated otherwise)
From Roosevelt to: Distance (km) Distance fare (@ Php1.10 per km) Distance fare + Php12.13 boarding fare Current fare Difference Increase (%)
Balintawak 1.87 2.06 14.19 12.00 2.19 18.23
Monumento 4.12 4.53 16.66 12.00 4.66 38.85
5th Avenue 5.21 5.73 17.86 12.00 5.86 48.84
R. Papa 6.16 6.78 18.91 12.00 6.91 57.55
J.A. Santos 6.82 7.50 19.63 15.00 4.63 30.88
Blumentritt 7.75 8.53 20.66 15.00 5.66 37.70
Tayuman 8.42 9.26 21.39 15.00 6.39 42.61
Bambang 9.04 9.94 22.07 15.00 7.07 47.16
D. Jose 9.69 10.66 22.79 15.00 7.79 51.93
Carriedo 10.37 11.41 23.54 15.00 8.54 56.91
Central 11.10 12.21 24.34 15.00 9.34 62.27
U.N. 12.31 13.54 25.67 15.00 10.67 71.14
Pedro Gil 13.06 14.37 26.50 15.00 11.50 76.64
Quirino 13.86 15.25 27.38 15.00 12.38 82.51
Vito Cruz 14.68 16.15 28.28 15.00 13.28 88.52
Buendia 15.75 17.33 29.46 15.00 14.46 96.37
Libertad 16.48 18.13 30.26 15.00 15.26 101.72
Edsa 17.49 19.24 31.37 20.00 11.37 56.85
Baclaran 18.07 19.88 32.01 20.00 12.01 60.04
Sources: LRT 1 privatization Concession Agreement and LRTA

Also, it is higher than the original and long-delayed fare hike that the DOTC approved which was P11 in boarding fare plus P1 per additional kilometer. If transportation officials decide to implement this (the approved fare) instead of the initial notional fare, the concessionaire is still assured to collect what was committed to them under the Concession Agreement. In the Concession Agreement, if the Approved Fare (e.g. P11 + 1) is lower than the Notional Fare (e.g. P12.13 + 1.10), government will pay the concessionaire the difference through the so-called Deficit Payment scheme.

In other words, the concessionaire is protected from any regulatory intervention on fare setting, as government, using taxpayers’ money, is obligated under the Concession Agreement to fulfill the guaranteed profits of the concessionaire (generated through the notional fare) at any cost. This is a form of regulatory risk guarantee that Aquino said he would use to promote his PPP program.

But the fare hike through the initial Notional Fare is just the start of regular and automatic fare increases under LRT 1 privatization. Under the Concession Agreement, once the extension of the LRT 1 to Bacoor, Cavite has been completed, the Notional Fare will be automatically increased by 5% through the Step-up Fare Adjustment.

Further, on top of the Step-up Fare Adjustment, the concessionaire is also entitled to increase the Notional Fare starting on August 1, 2016 and every second anniversary thereafter (or the Notional Fare Setting Date) by an effective rate of 5% per annum or 10.25% per adjustment through the Periodic Adjustment of the Notional Fare scheme.

This means that by August 1, 2016, the Notional Fare would now be P13.37 in boarding fare plus P1.21 in distance fare. An LRT 1 ride from Roosevelt to Baclaran thus would already cost around P35 by that time. And this assumes that the 5% Step-up Fare Adjustment is not yet being implemented two years from now (the Cavite extension is estimated to take three years).

Note that the Periodic Adjustment of the Notional Fare will occur every two years throughout the 32-year lifespan of the Concession Agreement. It could even be longer as the Concession Agreement may be extended until 50 years.

But the commuters’ woes do not end there. Aside from the Periodic Adjustment of the Notional Fare every two years, there is also the Inflation Rebasing of the Notional Fare every four years to reflect movements in inflation. The first inflation rebasing will take place in August 2018 per the Concession Agreement.

Indeed, the Concession Agreement applies the neoliberal principle of full cost recovery in LRT 1 fare determination, thus assuring the MVP-Ayala group of substantial profits at the expense of consumers.

On top of the regular and automatic fare adjustments already mentioned, the concessionaire is also entitled to the Differential Generation Cost mechanism, which allows it to pass on to the commuters the cost of extreme fluctuations in the generation costs of electricity through a fare hike (although capped at 5% of the notional fare).

Considering that LRT 1’s power supplier Manila Electric Co. (Meralco) is also controlled by the MVP group while the Ayalas are also in the power generation business, the Differential Generation Cost thus represent multiple oppression and burden for commuters and multiple profits for the MVP-Ayala tandem.

Finally, the Concession Agreement made it clear as well that in case a value-added tax (VAT) or sales tax is imposed on LRT 1 fares, the cost of such tax shall be fully passed on to the commuters, further bloating their burden.

LRT 1, even without a fare hike, is already generating more than enough revenues for LRTA and government. In 2013, LRT 1 operations generated a farebox ratio of 1.26, reportedly one of the highest in the international rail community. It means that revenues from commuter fares exceed the operating expenses of the system. It does not even include non-rail income (from advertising, lease, etc.). With increasing ridership and fares, LRT 1’s farebox ratio is expected to further rise, translating to more profits for the MVP-Ayala group.

If you still could not imagine how LRT 1 fares would cost several years from now under the operation and management of MVP, the Ayalas and their foreign partners, just look at the Metropolitan Waterworks and Sewerage System (MWSS). The MWSS Concession Agreement is very similar to the LRT 1 Concession Agreement with its provisions on rate rebasing, inflation-based adjustments, and other pass-on schemes. Since the MWSS privatization deal took effect in 1997, the average basic water rates have jumped by 585% (Maynilad) to 1,119% (Manila Water).

Another similarity? The MVP group (Maynilad) and the Ayalas (Manila Water) are also MWSS’s private concessionaires!

By clinching the LRT 1 privatization deal, the MVP-Ayala tandem is now starting to assert its monopoly control over Metro Manila’s light rail system. The duo has already bagged the P1.72-billion Automatic Fare Collection System (AFCS), another PPP project of the Aquino administration, which involves the operation and management of a centralized fare collection system using contactless-based smart card technology for LRT Lines 1 and 2, and MRT Line 3 (which the MVP group partly controls as well).

Meanwhile, the P1.4-billion LRT-MRT common station, which will connect the LRT Line 1 and MRT 3 (and the soon to be built MRT 7), will also be constructed by the MVP-Ayala tandem as part of the LRT 1 contract, and will be connected to the Ayala-owned Trinoma Mall – assuring it of an increasing stream of mall patrons.

In my next post, I will share the position paper prepared by a group calling itself the Alliance against LRT Privatization (AALP). Their paper comprehensively discussed other controversial issues related to the impending takeover of the MVP-Ayala group, including the massive displacement of LRT 1 employees. To be concluded (Read Part 2 – How Aquino betrayed public interest in LRT 1 privatization)


LRT, MRT fare hike: no other recourse but to protest

Today’s (February 4) public consultation on the LRT and MRT fare hike organized by the Light Rail Transit Authority (LRTA) and the Department of Transportation and Communications (DOTC) confirmed two important issues.

First, that the fare hike is indeed meant to pass on a bigger share of the debt burden to LRT and MRT commuters. The presentations of the technical staff of the two government agencies confirmed, in so many words, what we have been saying all along. Current fares are enough to cover the core expenses of operation and maintenance. But the onerous terms contained in the contracts created huge and even unnecessary debts for government.

Download the Powerpoint presentations of the LRTA here and the DOTC here.

Consider, for instance, the slides below which I lifted from the Powerpoint presentation of the DOTC on MRT. The first slide shows that the total income of the MRT in 2010 was P1.916 billion, of which P1.904 billion were generated from passenger fares.

However, as shown in the next slide, MRT expenses reached P8.52 billion during the same year which the DOTC said resulted in a government subsidy of P6.6 billion to bridge the shortfall in revenues (that was only P1.92 billion).

The next question is what makes up the P8.52 billion in expenses? The third slide below breaks down the P8.52 billion (the figures in the slide add up to P8.52 billion) and shows that operating costs comprise only 7.6 percent of the total and maintenance costs comprise only 13.9 percent. A huge 61.1 percent represents the Equity Rental Payment, which refers to DOTC payments for the 15 percent return on investment (ROI) that government guaranteed private investors in their Build Lease Transfer (BLT) agreement. Another 13.6 percent represents debt payments that government also guaranteed in the BLT.

The LRTA presentation on LRT 1 and 2 tells the same story about the so-called losses and subsidies that government wants to reduce by making commuters pay more. The slide below shows that the consolidated revenues of LRT 1 and 2 in 2010 was P3.089 billion but spent P2.928 billion for operation expenses. The LRTA also spent P3.556 billion for interest payments and others resulting in a net loss of P5.902 billion.

Add to these expenses the amortization of principal worth P2.341 billion and capital expenditures of P648 million, as shown in the slide below, further pushing the LRTA deficit in 2010 to P8.927 billion, which government claims is the cost of subsidy. In other words, of the P8.927 billion in so-called subsidy, P5.269 billion or more than 59 percent represents interest and principal payments for loans.

If you consider that almost 8 out of 10 LRT and MRT commuters are ordinary workers and employees and students, passing on an increasing portion of these debts, which include onerous loans, through a fare hike is a major, major injustice.

Secondly, LRTA administrator Rafael Rodriguez also confirmed that the public consultation is optional and therefore has no real bearing on the decision of Malacañang to increase the fare in LRT and MRT. This means that despite the opposition of those being consulted, students in this particular case, the LRTA and DOTC, as ordered by President Aquino, can still proceed with the fare hike anyway.

The consultation ended with the expected “We will study your concerns”, which was the gist of the closing statement made by DOTC Undersecretary for Rail Transport Glicerio Sicat. He also said that they will consider the option of lowering the increase and giving fare discounts because of the concerns raised by the students. This, however, dismissed altogether the issues of onerous debts, mass transport as public service, privatization as the driving motive behind the fare hike, and other major policy issues that were raised during the open forum.

Therefore, the commuters have no other option now but to continue and further intensify the protests until the Porsche-driving President backs down on his decision to raise the fares.