Governance, Human rights

Junk Duterte’s terror bill

Terorista lang daw ang target ng anti-terrorism bill ni Duterte?

The farmers, the lumad – they are the biggest victims of terrorism, by the state. Duterte made the Philippine countryside the deadliest place in the world for farmers, indigenous people and the advocates of their rights.

In 2019, for instance, we ranked first in the list of countries with the highest number of monitored extrajudicial killings of farmers, farm workers, indigenous people, and land activists with 38 cases and 50 victims. That’s about one killing per week. Colombia, another country notorious for its political killings of rural people and activists, was a far second with 21 monitored cases and 27 victims.

Read the full report here: https://bit.ly/2MwguyF

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COVID-19, Global issues, Governance

Duterte: COVID-19 figures not so bad; Data say otherwise

As Metro Manila and other areas prepare to transition from modified ECQ to GCQ, Pres. Duterte said Thursday (May 28) that figures on COVID-19 in the Philippines are “all in all, not so bad”.

“The death toll is 921. So you would see that the Philippines has…ratio and proportion vis-a-vis with the population, we have a low rate of mortality here in this country,” Duterte claimed.

But latest available data (as of May 28) show otherwise.

In ASEAN, the Philippines actually has the worst record in terms of COVID-19 deaths in relation to the population. Eight Filipinos die of COVID-19 per 1 million people in the country. In comparison, the death rate in Brunei and Indonesia is five per million people. Malaysia and Singapore have four deaths per million; Thailand has one.

Overall, the Philippines is the 12th worst country in Asia in terms of COVID-19 deaths relative to population size (as of this posting). We’re the worst among all countries not just in Southeast Asia but also in South Asia and East Asia. (See data here)

Relative to the number of confirmed COVID-19 cases, the Philippines ranks next to Indonesia in terms of the worst mortality rate in ASEAN. Indonesia has 6.10 deaths per 100 cases of COVID-19 while the Philippines has 5.91. Thailand has 1.86; Malaysia, 1.51; Brunei, 1.42; and Singapore, just 0.07. ###

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COVID-19, Governance, Human rights

PH has strictest lockdown in Asia, but ineffective vs. COVID-19

COVID-19 Strictest Lockdowns

If you feel that the COVID-19 lockdown being imposed by the Duterte regime is very strict, data say you are right. In fact, Duterte’s lockdown is the strictest in the region, even more rigid than that of his fellow authoritarian ruler Narendra Modi of India.

Compiling Google’s data on six categories of public mobility (retail and recreation; grocery stores and pharmacies; parks; transit stations; workplaces; and residential areas), the Nikkei Asian Review reported that the Philippines posted the largest average decline at 50.83 percent. With severe restrictions, the Duterte administration brought down public mobility by 85% in transit stations; by 79% in retail and recreation; and by 71% in workplaces. India ranked second with an average decline in public mobility by 47.83 percent.

But data also say these repressive lockdowns are not effective in the fight against COVID-19. While the Philippines and India are imposing very tight rules to restrict public mobility, they are still failing to bring down the number of new COVID-19 cases, which continue their upward trajectory after almost two months of lockdown.

On the contrary, countries that implemented less severe measures to control public mobility like Taiwan (2.16% decline in public mobility); South Korea (11.0%); Japan (13.83%); Vietnam (29.5%); and Thailand (31.66%) are significantly doing better in terms of bringing down the number of their daily new cases, as shown in the charts. (From EndCoronavirus.org)

Lockdowns are meant to hide the sorry state of public health systems and a convenient cover for leaders like Duterte (and Modi) to consolidate their authoritarian rule. The effective way to contain the spread of the new coronavirus are not repressive measures but reliable health and medical interventions, including testing.

Not surprisingly, there is an inverse correlation between testing and severity of lockdowns. Countries that conduct less tests tend to implement more severe lockdowns. India only conducts 1,042 tests per 1 million people while the Philippines conducts 1,379. Compare these figures to those countries that restricted public mobility less severely: Taiwan (2,790 tests per 1 million people); South Korea (12,773); Japan (1,502); Vietnam (2,681); and Thailand (3,264). (From Worldometer)

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COVID-19, Global issues, Governance

COVID-19 charts: PH death rate, testing capacity among worst in ASEAN

You know the Philippines is in deep shit when it has the highest number of #COVID19 deaths relative to the population and one of the worst testing capacities in the region, and yet all President Duterte could talk about are Martial Law and the NPA.

As of Apr. 24, the Philippines is averaging four COVID-19 deaths per 1 million people, the highest in ASEAN. This is twice the rate of Singapore and Indonesia, the top 2 countries in the region with the most number of novel coronavirus infections in absolute terms. (See Chart 1)

COVID-19 Deaths ASEAN for FB

Meanwhile, COVID-19 tests in the Philippines are among the lowest in ASEAN, pegged at 660 per 1 million people. Brunei is conducting more than 28,400 tests per million; Singapore, more than 16,200. Even Thailand is conducting thrice the number of tests that the Philippines does relative to its population. (See Chart 2)

COVID-19 Tests ASEAN for FB

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COVID-19, Global issues, Human rights

PH prisons: Ticking COVID-19 time bombs

The Philippines has the world’s most overcrowded prisons, according to the World Prison Brief (WPB). In Asia, a region where jammed detention facilities are ticking #COVID19 time bombs, Philippine prison overcrowding is twice as worse as Bangladesh, the distant second in the region in terms of prison overcrowding.

At the Quezon City jail, which is almost 5x overfilled, nine inmates and nine staff members are COVID-19 positive. In a Mandaluyong jail, 19 inmates and a staff are COVID-19 positive. In Cebu City, two inmates are infected. To be sure, there could be more.

Worse, Duterte’s Martial Law-like implementation of anti-COVID-19 measures is further overcrowding prison facilities unnecessarily. In the 35 days of enhanced community quarantine (ECQ), the Philippine National Police (PNP) has arrested 31,363 people for violating government’s draconian lockdown rules.

Those arrested include urban poor who were demanding government aid; people who were forced to eke out a living despite the ECQ due to lack of government support; and even more outrageously, relief volunteers who were assisting poor communities cope with the crisis amid absence of government assistance.

The militarist mindset and approach of the Duterte regime are further exposing the public to greater danger. ###

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Governance, Human rights

The people are not afraid of you, Mr. President

 

COVID-19 protest

“WE’RE STARVING”. Residents of an urban poor community in Sitio San Roque in Quezon City trooped to EDSA on Apr. 1 amid strict lockdown rules due to COVID-19 to demand relief from government. (Photo: Yahoo! News)

President Duterte’s militarist response to the COVID-19 crisis took a turn for the worse on Tuesday, Apr. 1. In a televised address to the nation, he warned people seeking government relief amid the pandemic that he will “shoot them dead”. His unscheduled speech was apparently triggered by the protest of an urban poor community in Sitio San Roque demanding the government assistance promised to them when the capital region was put on enhanced community quarantine (ECQ).

The police arrested 21 of the protesting urban poor, adding to the more than 17,000 mostly poor people arrested nationwide for violating government’s lockdown policies. Compare the number of people arrested by the Philippine National Police (PNP) to the number of persons tested by the Department of Health (DOH) to combat COVID-19, which stood at just 3,938.

Filipinos have been enduring Duterte’s mindless and violent rants for four years now. But his latest incendiary rhetoric of ordering his police and soldiers to kill without hesitation those who violate his authoritarian ECQ hits differently for most. Locked down, deprived of mobility and productive work, starved and grappling with fear and uncertainty so much as with the unfamiliar virus as with government’s overall response to contain it, the people are enraged.

Duterte, as he is wont to do every time the legitimacy of his leadership is challenged, framed his virulent tirade as a warning to the Left, whose only desire according to the long ailing Chief Executive is to destabilize his government. He thought that this would justify his violent diatribe because the Left is supposedly an enemy of the state.

But the public felt it was not just addressed to the Left; or more likely they have already identified with the legitimate demands of the Left from this regime. Whichever is the case, Duterte is picking a fight not just against the politically organized sections of society, but all the people harshly impacted by the COVID-19 pandemic and government’s tyrannical response to a public health crisis.

The erstwhile apolitical, be they public personalities or one’s family and friends, are speaking up over Twitter or dinner against Duterte’s heartless verbal onslaught and its real implications to people’s welfare, especially those who are vulnerable to more hunger and poverty. The ECQ may have prevented public gatherings, but it also gave people more time online to discuss, share and process their collective thoughts and sentiments against the regime. It gave families and neighborhoods more time together to agree as a group how insufferable and contemptible the President and his men have become.

The ECQ meant to isolate the people from each other because of COVID-19 is ironically bringing more and more together in the conviction that the current state of the nation is no longer acceptable and tolerable. The people are not afraid of you, Mr. President. They are increasingly finding strength and courage from each other.

Duterte and his Defense and military people who are behind and in charge of the lockdown wrongly thought that their dastardly agenda of repressing dissent and democratic rights under the pretext of political stability has been made easier by the COVID-19 pandemic. On the contrary, the crisis and the government measures to supposedly address it in fact have heightened the conditions for greater social unrest and conflict, and for people to organize and take collective political actions.

The existing and emerging material conditions for these are unmistakable. Duterte’s own economic managers are forecasting an economic contraction of as much as 0.6% and job losses of as high as 1.8 million (one million in Luzon alone) this year due to the pandemic. Total economic losses could reach as much as PHP 1.36 trillion, with Luzon accounting for more than one trillion These estimates assume that the ECQ will only last for a month.

As the crisis is global, the economy could not rely on foreign exchange, including remittances from overseas Filipinos and foreign trade, to boost domestic consumption. The world economy may already be in a recession that some economists say is comparable in severity to the 2008-2009 Great Recession. Or it can even be worse. The International Labor Organization (ILO), for instance, estimates that the COVID-19 pandemic could wipe out up to 24.7 million jobs worldwide. For comparison, the global financial and economic crisis 10 years ago claimed 22 million jobs.

The National Economic and Development Authority (NEDA) expects remittances to drop by as much as PHP 8.5 billion this year due to the crisis. Many Filipino families will face hardship in the coming months, even long after the lockdown has been lifted. They include not just the urban and rural poor, who are the most exposed to the impacts of pandemics and economic declines, but even those who used to have the means to spend more. The pressure will further increase for government to provide social and economic services, something that the COVID-19 crisis has shown the regime is incapable of.

There is a disease spreading in government that is plunging the nation into chaos and death. It is not caused by the novel coronavirus, but by the old, familiar virus of authoritarianism. To get rid of this virus and heal as one, the country truly needs a bayanihan – to determinedly and strongly work together as a people in building a government and a nation that is truly theirs. In this battle, all the oppressed are frontliners.

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Economy

Economy continues slowdown under Duterte

The gross domestic product (GDP) grew by just 5.6% in the first quarter of 2019. That’s the slowest quarterly growth in four years.

Duterte’s economic managers are pinning the blame on the delayed passage of the 2019 national budget. What they do not say is that the slowdown this quarter is just a continuation of the overall trend of slowing economic growth since the Duterte administration took over in 2016. (See chart below)

Annual GDP growth rate averaged 6.9% in 2016, then slowed down to 6.7% in 2017, and further to 6.2% last year.

Not that the economy was in a better shape under Aquino and the previous regimes.

But the slowdown under Duterte shows that absent fundamental economic reforms to boost agricultural production and encourage manufacturing expansion that will create long-term, productive jobs; promote domestic consumption as growth driver (e.g., through substantial wage hikes and removal of onerous taxes); etc., the relatively rapid growth in the first half of 2010s is not sustainable.

What we have seen under Duterte so far is the further destruction of agriculture and rural livelihoods such as through the Rice Tariffication Law; continuation of the low wage policy to attract foreign investors; additional tax burden under the TRAIN Law, etc.

Duterte’s economic managers think that infrastructure spending (i.e., “Build, Build, Build”) will impact GDP figures positively. But this may be true only in the short term. As the program relies heavily on public debt, not to mention that most of the infrastructure will be privatized anyway, it will actually create more problems for the economy and the people in the long term. ###

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Human rights

Who is afraid of IBON?

images.jpeg
(Photo: Politiko)

The only reason that Malacañang is going after groups like IBON Foundation is that because they have been very effective in exposing the lies of the Duterte government.

IBON has been effective in refuting the false claims of Duterte’s economic managers about the TRAIN Law, inflation, improving employment situation, benefits of Chinese loans, etc.

Instead of squarely and convincingly proving as false the fact-based criticisms of IBON or look at its concrete proposals to address the country’s economic woes, the Duterte administration resorts to malicious accusations.

For the past 40 years, IBON has established itself as a reliable source of progressive research and analysis on national socioeconomic issues. From Marcos to Duterte – IBON has been consistent in its position that economics should be about the people, their rights and interests.

But the Duterte administration obviously has zero tolerance for views and alternatives that contradict its policies and programs, including on the economy. Thus, it uses public resources not only to question the legitimacy of IBON but to apparently try to shut it down.

What Malacañang is doing is blatant repression. And while it targets the sources of funding support of IBON, the irresponsible act of the Duterte government also puts the officials and staff of IBON at risk of physical harm.

That is criminal and reprehensible. ###

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Consumer issues, Economy, Free trade

PH rice import dependence rising amid weakening global production

Annual growth in rice production global

In the past two decades, imported rice has been accounting for an increasing portion of our domestic consumption. Prior to the 1995 birth of the World Trade Organization (WTO), the country’s rice import dependency ratio (i.e., the extent of dependency on importation in relation to domestic consumption) only averaged 2.45% (1990 to 1994 average). In the latest available 10-year average (2006 to 2016), the ratio has risen by 4.5 times to 11.06 percent. In the immediate 10 years since the WTO (1995 to 2005), the average ratio was 11.24 percent.

Despite increasing dependence on cheaper imported rice, the retail price of rice has continued to rise. The average annual inflation rate for rice accelerated from 4% in 1996-2006 to 5.7% in 2006-2016. Apparently, more rice imports do not necessarily translate to lower retail prices. Yet, to tame rising rice prices and ease faster overall inflation, the Duterte administration’s answer is further liberalization of rice imports through the Rice Tariffication Bill(RTB). Already passed by the Houselast month, a Senate RTB counterpart is expected before the year ends.

The RTB will liberalize rice trade by removing the quantitative restriction (QR) on imported rice. This entails scrapping the current minimum access volume (MAV) which caps rice imports at 805,200 metric tons (MT) with a 35% in-quota (e.g. within MAV) tariff. Rice imports outside the MAV are slapped with a 40% tariff. In lieu of a QR, a general tariff will be imposed.

Rice tariffication and liberalization is a Philippine commitment to the WTO but repeatedly postponed in the past due to the socially sensitive nature of rice as an agricultural commodity. The Duterte administration used the soaring price of riceto justify finally replacing the rice QR with tariff, selling the idea that the entry of more imports will bring down local prices. As of the third week of August, well-milled rice retails at Php46.35 per kilo (10% higher than a year ago) and regular milled rice at Php42.85 (13% higher).

According to government’s economic managers, tariffication could reduce the priceof rice by as much as Php4.31 per kilo and lessen inflation by at least one percentage point. Rice production in Thailand and Vietnam, the country’s main sources of rice imports, is pegged at Php6 per kilo. In the Philippines, production cost is said to be double that amount.

While not a guarantee to lower prices in the long run, opening up the rice sector to unbridled imports leaves the country’s rice security at the mercy of an unpredictable and increasingly unreliable world market. This as 95% of Philippine rice imports come from just two countries whose own domestic production is either slowing down or declining. Globally, rice production has been steadily decelerating in the past four decades.

At the same time, the already precarious livelihoodof up to 20 million Filipinos who rely on the rice sector, including some 2.5 million rice farmers, gets more insecure than ever.

Rice production in Vietnam, which accounts for almost 69% of Philippine rice imports (2010 to 2016 average), and in Thailand, which comprises 26%, has been weakening in the past four decades. In Vietnam, rice (paddy) production decelerated from an annual growth of more than 5% in the 1980s and 1990s to 2.2% in the 2000s, and 1.6% this decade. Thailand’s rice production slowed down from a yearly growth of 3% in the 1980s to 2.1% in the 1990s, before recovering to 3.1% in the 2000s. But this decade, Thai rice production is actually contracting by 3.1% every year.

Other Southeast Asian countries that are also among the world’s major rice exporters (and potential Philippine suppliers) are experiencing production declines as well. Myanmar’s rice (paddy) production went down from an annual growth of 4.9% in the 2000s to a yearly contraction of 3.1% this decade. Cambodia is still posting a 3.8 growth since 2010, but it’s twice slower than its annual expansion of 7.4% last decade.

Our own rice (paddy) production has decelerated to 1.2% this decade from a more than 3%-annual expansion in the 1990s and 2000s and about 4-5% in the 1960s and 1970s. Worldwide, rice production has been continuously slowing since the 1980s when annual growth was pegged at 3.2 percent. This declined to 1.8% in the 1990s; 1.2% in the 2000s; and 1.1% in the 2010s.

It is estimated that lifting the QR on rice will double the volume of the country’s rice imports in five years. For the already impoverished Filipino rice farmers, this means a sharp drop in income (some projections say by around 29%) as rice that are 100% cheaper to produce in Thailand and Vietnam due to heavy subsidies flood the domestic market.

Government allays fears of more bankruptcy among rice farmers through the proposed six-year Rice Competitiveness Enhancement Fund (Rice Fund) where all the duties collected from rice imports would be supposedly used to support small rice farmers. The central bank estimates an additional Php28 billion in annual revenues from rice tariffs that could be used to help prepare rice farmers for competition from imports through the Rice Fund.

But this was the same promise made to vegetable farmers and fisher folk most affected by WTO tariffication in 1995 with the Agricultural Competitiveness Enhance Fund (ACEF). Marred by corruption and mismanagement issues, the fund only ended up favoring agribusiness corporations as small farmers and fisher folk were further impoverished by massive agricultural imports.

In fact, since its introduction more than two decades ago, ACEF’s initial six-year life has been extended and reformed several times – the most recent in 2016, with implementation starting this year– because it has failed to achieve its stated objectives of protecting and preparing the farmers and fisher folk.

As mentioned, the influx of cheaper imported rice has not resulted to cheaper retail prices for consumers. The monopoly control that big private traders have over imported rice and those procured from local farmers allows them to keep retail prices high even as farmgate prices are depressed. Privatization and deregulation of its functions on palay procurement, rice importation, marketing and price control have made the National Food Authority (NFA) inutile in affecting prices. Inefficiency and corruption made the situation even worse.

Even as the price of rice continued to increase, the farmer’s share to retail prices is actually lower today. Prior to the WTO, farmer’s share to consumer peso (i.e. how much of the price paid by the consumers goes back to the rice farmers) decreased from 30.5% (1990 to 1994 average) to 28.3% in 1995 to 2005 and just slightly climbing up to 28.6% in 2006 to 2016. Note that the actual amount that goes to the rice farmers is much lower due to usury and landlessness that eat into their share in prices.

Liberalization harms both the consumers and rice farmers, and only the foreign and domestic private traders reap the benefits. Tariffication and the promotion of more imports give these private traders even greater control over the rice industry. ###

Sources of data: Philippine Statistics Authority (PSA); Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO)

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Governance, Human rights, Military & war

Militarizing development work: Army chief Rolando Bautista as DSWD head

gen10-afp-joselito-bautista-kjrosales2_2018-05-22_22-17-53
(Photo: The Philippine Star)

By appointing Army chief Rolando Bautista as the next DSWD Secretary, Pres. Duterte is transforming government’s social welfare and development work into one big Civilian Military Operations (CMO) for counterinsurgency.

This has serious implications, among others –

  1. It will undermine genuine development work. Already limited public resources intended for development will be further and more systematically diverted for military purposes. Gains will be measured not in development terms but whether target rebel groups have been weakened.
  2. Poor communities that require assistance will be held hostage by the military agenda as government assistance would be contingent not on their actual and urgent needs but on their support and cooperation with the military’s counterinsurgency campaign.
  3. It will make the job of civilian development workers more difficult and could even put them at risk as they will be seen as agents of the military, who many communities distrust because of their atrocities.

Thus, instead of development and peace, militarizing development work with Bautista’s appointment as DSWD chief will actually bring greater poverty and conflict. ###

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