Kapag bumili, halimbawa, ang presidente o CEO ng isang malaking kumpanya ng luxury car gaya ng Toyota Alphard 3.5 V6 na ang presyo ay nasa Php3.28 million, makakatipid siya nang hanggang Php337,000.
Si manang tindera sa sari-sari store na kailangang bumyahe sa Divisoria para mamili ng mga paninda ay maaaring magbabayad ng dagdag-pasahe sa dyipni nang hanggang Php4, o hanggang Php8 kung balikan. Magiging mas mahal na rin ang bibilhin nyang mga paninda gaya ng yosi na tataas ang presyo nang Php2.50 bawat kaha at softdrinks na tataas nang Php12 kada litro. Kailangan ni manang tindera ng mas malaking puhunan, habang maaaring liliit naman ang kanyang dati nang maliit na kita.
Si manang tindera at kapwa mahihirap nyang suki ang magbabayad sa matitipid ni CEO sa kanyang luxury car.
Ito sa simpleng salita, ang ibig sabihin ng TRAIN (Tax Reform for Acceleration and Inclusion) para sa mayaman at mahirap.
Nakakalula ang laki ng sahod ng mga CEO ng mga dambuhalang korporasyon sa bansa. Ang average na sahod ng CEO ng Metro Pacific Investments Corp. (MPIC) at Meralco nina Manny V. Pangilinan ay nasa halos Php8 million kada buwan. Ang mga CEO na nasa Ayala ay sumasahod ng halos Php7 million kada buwan. Sina Ramon Ang sa San Miguel Corp. (SMC), sumasahod kada buwan nang halos Php6 million. Si manang tindera? Swerte nang kumita ang kanyang pamilya ng Php2,700 sa isang buwan (batay sa 2015 Family Income and Expenditure Survey o FIES ng gobyerno).
Noong 2016, ang tinubo ng top 1,000 corporations sa bansa na kontrolado nina Pangilinan, Ayala, Ang at iba pang super rich kasama na ang mga dayuhan ay umabot sa Php1.24 trillion, mas malaki pa nang halos 15% sa tinubo nila noong 2015.
Yan lang ang deklarado o alam ng publiko. Magkano pa kaya ang totoo? Kaya walang epekto sa kanila ang anumang taas-presyo sa mga produkto o serbisyo. Sila nga ang may monopolyo sa mga produkto at serbisyo sa bansa at lahat ng taas-presyo ay ipinapasa sa pobreng mamimili. Laruan lang sa super rich ang mga luxury cars, tapos makakatipid pa sila nang daan-daang libo kapag bumili ng mga ito?
Sa kabilang banda, marami sa mga Pilipino ang gaya ni manang tindera na umaasa sa informal economy bilang nagtitingi ng produkto o nagbibigay ng serbisyo gaya ng mga drayber ng traysikel at dyipni, o mga tindera sa karinderya. Wala silang buwanang sahod. At marami sa kanilang kostumer ay mga galing din sa informal economy. Ibig sabihin, hindi sila makikinabang sa mas mataas daw na take home pay dahil sa mas mababang income tax. Pero tiyak na tataas ang kanilang gastos.
Si manong tsuper ng dyipni ay magbabayad ng dagdag na Php2.80 kada litro ngayong taon sa diesel habang si manong traysikel drayber ay may taas-gastos sa gasolina nang Php2.97 kada litro. Si manang may-karinderya ay tataas ang gastos sa LPG nang Php12 kada tangke (11-kg). Batay ito sa pahayag ng DOE.
Paano ang mga magsasaka at mangingisda – na pinakamataas ang poverty incidence sa lahat ng sektor (kapwa nasa 34% sa pinakahuling official data) – na umaasa sa kerosene, na tataas nang Php3.30 kada litro dahil sa TRAIN (pinakamalaki sa lahat ng produktong petrolyo) bilang pang-ilaw, pangluto at sa paghahanapbuhay?
Ngayong taon pa lang yan. Sa susunod na 3 taon, lalo pang tataas ang presyo ng langis dahil sa TRAIN, bukod pa sa halos linggo-linggong oil price hike dahil sa deregulasyon. Binibilang pa lang natin ang direktang impact. Ang pagtaas sa presyo ng langis (at kuryente bunga pa rin ng TRAIN) ay may domino effect sa presyo ng iba pang produkto’t serbisyo.
Lampas 15 million ng mga may-trabaho sa bansa ang walang regular na buwanang sahod o hindi nga sumasahod kahit nagtatrabaho, katumbas halos ng 37% ng kabuuang bilang ng employed noong 2017, kabilang ang gaya nina manang tindera at manong drayber. Paano pa kaya ang mga walang trabaho na nasa 2.4 million batay sa pinababang unemployment rate ng gobyerno?
Pero maraming ordinaryong manggagawa o empleyadong may regular na sahod ay hindi rin naman makikinabang sa TRAIN. Walang madadagdag sa sahod ng mga dati nang sumasahod ng minimum wage o mas mababa pa na bumubuo sa halos kalahati (46%) ng lahat ng manggagawa sa Pilipinas. Pero papasanin nila ang pagtaas ng mga presyo’t bayarin dahil sa TRAIN.
Kakarampot na nga ang minimum wage sa bansa. Bago pa ang impact ng TRAIN, ang minimum wage ay wala na sa kalahati ng tinatayang cost of living (hal. sa NCR, nasa Php1,130 ang cost of living kada pamilya kada araw kumpara sa arawang minimum wage na Php512). Paano kung maging mas mahal pa ang mga bilihin at serbisyo dahil sa dagdag-buwis?
Babawiin din ng taas-presyo dahil sa dagdag-buwis ang sinasabing pagbaba ng personal income tax. Kahit ang mga mataas-taas ang sahod at may pambayad pa, halimbawa, sa Uber o Grab ay hindi ligtas. Nagsabi na ang Grab ng taas-singil sa pasahe nang aabot sa Php13 dahil sa TRAIN. Mas mataas na ang gastos sa gasolina ng mga de-kotseng middle class. Hindi pa pinag-uusapan na inaalis ng TRAIN ang dating tax exemption na hanggang Php100,000 para sa 4 na dependents (hal. anak) ng isang taxpayer (o Php25,000 kada dependent) bukod pa sa personal exemption na Php50,000.
Isang paraan ang progresibong pagbubuwis para tiyakin ang makatarungang pamamahagi ng yaman ng isang lipunan. Pero kung ang mahihirap ang papasan ng buwis para sa maluhong pamumuhay ng mayayaman, hindi lang iyan regressive, pang-aapi na iyan. #
A fare hike after the presidential State of the Nation Address (Sona) and massive retrenchment of LRT 1 employees by early next year are among the immediate impacts of the Php64.9-billion LRT 1 extension and privatization project.
As the lone bidder in the largest public-private partnership (PPP) deal of the Aquino administration, the group led by Metro Pacific Investments Corp. (MPIC) of Manny Pangilinan (MVP)/Salim Group (Indonesia) and Ayala Corp. of the Ayala family, a long-time crony of the Aquinos, is now all set to take over the operation of the country’s first-ever metropolitan rail system from the Light Rail Transit Authority (LRTA).
MPIC (55%) and Ayala (35%), together with Australia-based investment giant Macquaire (10%) have formed the Light Rail Manila Consortium to extend the LRT 1 from its current endpoint in Baclaran to Niyog in Bacoor, Cavite.
I was able to obtain a copy of the final Concession Agreement and its Annexes/Schedules. You may download the Concession Agreement here. As for the Schedules, contact me through the comment section below to get a copy. The files are too big and it takes time to upload everything.
Based on the Concession Agreement and Schedules, the concessionaires will implement an initial Notional Fare composed of P12.13 in boarding fare plus P1.10 per kilometer (distance fare component) starting on August 1, 2014. Notional fare refers to the fare that the concessionaire is entitled to under the Concession Agreement.
This means that a commuter travelling from Roosevelt to Baclaran will pay a new fare of more than P32 – representing the P12.13 in boarding fare plus a distance fare of P19.88 (P1.10 x 18.07 kilometers or the distance between the Roosevelt and Baclaran stations). That’s P12 more or 60% higher than the current fare. (See Table)
Old fares vs. new fares under LRT 1 privatization (Figures in pesos unless stated otherwise)
From Roosevelt to:
Distance fare (@ Php1.10 per km)
Distance fare + Php12.13 boarding fare
Sources: LRT 1 privatization Concession Agreement and LRTA
Also, it is higher than the original and long-delayed fare hike that the DOTC approved which was P11 in boarding fare plus P1 per additional kilometer. If transportation officials decide to implement this (the approved fare) instead of the initial notional fare, the concessionaire is still assured to collect what was committed to them under the Concession Agreement. In the Concession Agreement, if the Approved Fare (e.g. P11 + 1) is lower than the Notional Fare (e.g. P12.13 + 1.10), government will pay the concessionaire the difference through the so-called Deficit Payment scheme.
In other words, the concessionaire is protected from any regulatory intervention on fare setting, as government, using taxpayers’ money, is obligated under the Concession Agreement to fulfill the guaranteed profits of the concessionaire (generated through the notional fare) at any cost. This is a form of regulatory risk guarantee that Aquino said he would use to promote his PPP program.
But the fare hike through the initial Notional Fare is just the start of regular and automatic fare increases under LRT 1 privatization. Under the Concession Agreement, once the extension of the LRT 1 to Bacoor, Cavite has been completed, the Notional Fare will be automatically increased by 5% through the Step-up Fare Adjustment.
Further, on top of the Step-up Fare Adjustment, the concessionaire is also entitled to increase the Notional Fare starting on August 1, 2016 and every second anniversary thereafter (or the Notional Fare Setting Date) by an effective rate of 5% per annum or 10.25% per adjustment through the Periodic Adjustment of the Notional Fare scheme.
This means that by August 1, 2016, the Notional Fare would now be P13.37 in boarding fare plus P1.21 in distance fare. An LRT 1 ride from Roosevelt to Baclaran thus would already cost around P35 by that time. And this assumes that the 5% Step-up Fare Adjustment is not yet being implemented two years from now (the Cavite extension is estimated to take three years).
Note that the Periodic Adjustment of the Notional Fare will occur every two years throughout the 32-year lifespan of the Concession Agreement. It could even be longer as the Concession Agreement may be extended until 50 years.
But the commuters’ woes do not end there. Aside from the Periodic Adjustment of the Notional Fare every two years, there is also the Inflation Rebasing of the Notional Fare every four years to reflect movements in inflation. The first inflation rebasing will take place in August 2018 per the Concession Agreement.
Indeed, the Concession Agreement applies the neoliberal principle of full cost recovery in LRT 1 fare determination, thus assuring the MVP-Ayala group of substantial profits at the expense of consumers.
On top of the regular and automatic fare adjustments already mentioned, the concessionaire is also entitled to the Differential Generation Cost mechanism, which allows it to pass on to the commuters the cost of extreme fluctuations in the generation costs of electricity through a fare hike (although capped at 5% of the notional fare).
Considering that LRT 1’s power supplier Manila Electric Co. (Meralco) is also controlled by the MVP group while the Ayalas are also in the power generation business, the Differential Generation Cost thus represent multiple oppression and burden for commuters and multiple profits for the MVP-Ayala tandem.
Finally, the Concession Agreement made it clear as well that in case a value-added tax (VAT) or sales tax is imposed on LRT 1 fares, the cost of such tax shall be fully passed on to the commuters, further bloating their burden.
LRT 1, even without a fare hike, is already generating more than enough revenues for LRTA and government. In 2013, LRT 1 operations generated a farebox ratio of 1.26, reportedly one of the highest in the international rail community. It means that revenues from commuter fares exceed the operating expenses of the system. It does not even include non-rail income (from advertising, lease, etc.). With increasing ridership and fares, LRT 1’s farebox ratio is expected to further rise, translating to more profits for the MVP-Ayala group.
If you still could not imagine how LRT 1 fares would cost several years from now under the operation and management of MVP, the Ayalas and their foreign partners, just look at the Metropolitan Waterworks and Sewerage System (MWSS). The MWSS Concession Agreement is very similar to the LRT 1 Concession Agreement with its provisions on rate rebasing, inflation-based adjustments, and other pass-on schemes. Since the MWSS privatization deal took effect in 1997, the average basic water rates have jumped by 585% (Maynilad) to 1,119% (Manila Water).
Another similarity? The MVP group (Maynilad) and the Ayalas (Manila Water) are also MWSS’s private concessionaires!
By clinching the LRT 1 privatization deal, the MVP-Ayala tandem is now starting to assert its monopoly control over Metro Manila’s light rail system. The duo has already bagged the P1.72-billion Automatic Fare Collection System (AFCS), another PPP project of the Aquino administration, which involves the operation and management of a centralized fare collection system using contactless-based smart card technology for LRT Lines 1 and 2, and MRT Line 3 (which the MVP group partly controls as well).
Meanwhile, the P1.4-billion LRT-MRT common station, which will connect the LRT Line 1 and MRT 3 (and the soon to be built MRT 7), will also be constructed by the MVP-Ayala tandem as part of the LRT 1 contract, and will be connected to the Ayala-owned Trinoma Mall – assuring it of an increasing stream of mall patrons.
In my next post, I will share the position paper prepared by a group calling itself the Alliance against LRT Privatization (AALP). Their paper comprehensively discussed other controversial issues related to the impending takeover of the MVP-Ayala group, including the massive displacement of LRT 1 employees. To be concluded (Read Part 2 – How Aquino betrayed public interest in LRT 1 privatization)
By July, the 14.2 million consumers of Maynilad Water Services Inc. and Manila Water Co. Inc. will have to shell out more for their water bill. If your household is consuming 30 cubic meters (cu. m.) a month, be ready to pay an additional P234 (if your service provider is Manila Water) to P342 (Maynilad). That’s how huge the looming rate hikes are. Apparently, the 42% annual increase in the profits of Maynilad and 18% for Manila Water in the past five years are not enough for the Big Water monopolies. They want more, at our expense, of course.
The increases are due to the so-called “rate rebasing”. It’s a rate adjustment process mandated by the 1997 privatization contract or the Concession Agreement between the MWSS and its private concessionaires – Maynilad and Manila Water. Under the Concession Agreement, the concessionaires are entitled to adjust their basic rates every five years throughout the 40-year contract to achieve a guaranteed rate of return. During the rate rebasing exercise, the concessionaires submit their previous five-year performance, their new five-year business plans and their proposed tariffs to implement it, which the MWSS-Regulatory Office (MWSS-RO) reviews and approves. Since the last rate rebasing exercise in 2007, Maynilad has been posting annual profits of P3.92 billion and Manila Water, P3.68 billion. During the public consultations, Manila Water said they expect to earn P5 billion annually in the next five years after the rate rebasing; Maynilad refused to disclose its anticipated profits.
According to regulators, Manila Water wants a rate hike of P5.83 per cu. m. and Maynilad, P8.58 (revised from the P10.30 reported earlier). But these refer to the basic charge only. If you look at your water bill, there are other items in it that will also increase when the basic charge is raised. The environmental charge, for example, is 20% of the basic charge. Then, there’s the foreign currency differential adjustment (FCDA), which accounts for the quarterly fluctuations in the foreign exchange (forex). The FCDA is negative when the peso gains against the dollar and is positive when the peso weakens. The FCDA is currently at negative 0.37% of the basic charge for Manila Water and negative 0.98% for Maynilad. The FCDA is expected to be positive as the dollar is gaining strength in recent months. Then, there’s also the value-added tax (VAT), which is 12% of the basic charge plus the environmental charge. Factoring in these other charges, the rate hike of Manila Water could reach P7.81 per cu. m. and Maynilad, P11.41 per cu. m. Thus, the estimated P234 to P342 increase for households consuming 30 cu. m.
The table below compares our estimated monthly bills today and after the rate hikes are implemented. (Note: The table has been revised to adjust the estimated monthly water bill for Maynilad customers using 10 cu. m.)
Unreasonable rate hikes
The rate increases being sought by Maynilad and Manila Water are unreasonable for two major reasons. First, the rate hikes cover not just the cost of past projects (which consumers also finance through water tariffs) but also include future expansion and improvement plans. This means that the private concessionaires want to charge consumers the cost of projects that are yet to be implemented. This is clearly anti-consumer and allows the abuses of Maynilad and Manila Water. In their previous rate rebasing exercises, the private concessionaires charged the costs of unimplemented projects to their consumers such as the Laiban Dam Project and the 15 CMS Water Source Replacement Project, among others. According to the MWSS-RO, the costs of unimplemented projects are recovered through succeeding rate rebasing exercises. If that is the case, then water rates should have been reduced during the 2007 rate rebasing. But this did not happen because the cost of new future projects as well as new assumptions in the business plans (population growth, demand, etc.) of the concessionaires negate the supposed cost recovery of unimplemented projects in favor of the consumers. The same scenario is expected in the ongoing rate rebasing exercise.
Second, the private concessionaires are earning profits at unreasonably rapid pace. Using the return on rate base (RORB), for instance, it appears that Maynilad and Manila Water are earning beyond the 12% limit imposed on public utilities. Estimates peg the RORB of the concessionaires at more than 14 percent. The rate base is computed by adding up the value of all the assets used in the operation of the public utility and from it, the allowed rate of return is calculated. Thus, the RORB of Maynilad and Manila Water could further go up beyond the estimated 14% if the total value of the old MWSS assets already built prior to privatization is excluded. Meanwhile, using the return on equity (ROE) as standard, it also appears that Maynilad and Manila Water are profiting tremendously from their operations. It is estimated, for instance, that Manila Water has an ROE of around 19% while Maynilad has about 45 percent. These are way higher than the ROE of those in other public utilities such as telecommunications (16%) and electricity (15%). The ROE is a measure of profitability wherein the net income is computed as a proportion of the equity or the investments poured in by the investors. Maynilad and Manila Water has a very high ROE because of the very high tariffs they set while a very large chunk of the cost of MWSS privatization is financed by loans (which are fully passed on to consumers) and not by their actual investments.
Big Water running the government
Alas, despite this really onerous burden awaiting us, we should not expect the Aquino government to step in and restrain the greed of Big Water. Maynilad and Manila Water managed to put their top officials in strategic Cabinet positions, advising the President on key government policies. Secretary Rogelio Singson used to be the president and chief executive officer (CEO) of Maynilad. He now heads the Department of Public Works and Highways (DPWH), where the Metropolitan Waterworks and Sewerage System (MWSS) is an attached agency. Secretary Rene Almendras used to be the president of Manila Water. He is now the so-called “Little President” of the Philippines, after a stint as chief of the Department of Energy (DOE). Almendras is reportedly one of the closest to Aquino, being in the innermost of the inner circle of the President.
Singson has the notoriety of generating the first political controversy faced by the Aquino administration. Just a week after taking over as DPWH Secretary, Singson appointed himself as ex-officio chairman of the Board of Trustees of the MWSS. While the move was obviously sanctioned by Malacañang through Executive Secretary Paquito Ochoa, Singson was forced to backtrack after his self-appointment as MWSS head was widely criticized due to conflict of interest. Prior to his appointment as DPWH Secretary, Singson, as Maynilad CEO, tried to seal a midnight deal with Efraim Genuino, Gloria Arroyo’s appointed chairman of the Philippine Amusement and Gaming Corp. (PAGCOR). It involved a water concession deal for the Bagong Nayong Pilipino Entertainment City in Parañaque City that would have reportedly deprived government of an estimated P3.6 billion in water fees. Days before Aquino’s inauguration, Genuino and Singson allegedly teamed up to lobby the MWSS Board to approve the deal because Maynilad was concerned that the new PAGCOR leadership under Aquino might not be as accommodating as Genuino. President Aquino, however, defended Singson, saying that he was satisfied with the Cabinet official’s, as well as PAGCOR’s, explanation that there was no contract yet.
Almendras, meanwhile, enjoys a close friendship with Aquino, which dates back to their Ateneo days. His current office, Cabinet Secretary, was created by the President to accommodate Almendras, whom Aquino had to remove from the DOE after a dismal performance underlined by the Mindanao power crisis. The office of the Cabinet Secretary used to be the office of the Cabinet Secretariat which simply facilitates information in Malacañang, according to a Philippine Daily Inquirer report. But Aquino transformed the office through Executive Order (EO) No. 99 and gave Almendras the mandate to among others, determine priorities in the Philippine Development Plan (PDP) and sit in the National Economic and Development Authority (NEDA) board executive committee and subcommittees on infrastructure, social development and investment. NEDA approves public-private partnership (PPP) projects such as MWSS’s Concession Agreements with Manila Water and Maynilad. Changes in the contract between the MWSS and the private concessionaires, including those that concern water rates, also require NEDA sanction.
Aquino indeed has deep ties with the Big Water monopolies. The Ayala family, which controls Manila Water, has a long history of close association with the Aquino family, dating back to the time of Aquino’s late mother Cory as Philippine President. Manny V. Pangilinan, who controls Maynilad, has done a number of mega business deals with presidential cousin and officially declared top Aquino funder in the 2010 polls, Tonyboy Cojuangco such as the PLDT and TV5 deals. MVP and the Ayalas are seen as among the major backers of Aquino in his presidential bid. So don’t be surprised that the chief executives of their business interests landed strategic Cabinet positions.
Don’t be surprised as well that Aquino made PPP or privatization his centerpiece economic program. PPP creates more opportunities for MVP and the Ayalas to further expand their business empires. In fact, Pangilinan’s group and the Ayala family are among the most aggressive in cornering PPP contracts being offered by administration. The Ayalas, for instance, clinched the very first PPP project of Aquino – the P1.96-billion Daang Hari-SLEX Link Road Project. Meanwhile, MVP and the Ayalas have teamed up to bid for the P60-billion extension and privatization of LRT 1, the largest PPP project of the Aquino administration. Incidentally, Malacañang is even using the privatization of MWSS as a showcase in promoting PPP. MWSS privatization is truly a showcase of how PPP can be so profitable for big business. But it’s also a showcase of how privatization can be so oppressive and onerous.
MVP’s Metro Pacific Investments Corp. (MPIC) holds 43% of Maynilad. The Consunji family, which also has close ties with Aquino, controls 25% through DMCI Holdings. Big foreign companies have a substantial share in Maynilad as well with MCNK JV Corp., a unit of Japanese giant Marubeni Corp., and Lyonnaise Asia Water Limited, a unit of French firm Suez, one of the world’s largest water companies, each holding a 16% stake. The Ayala Corporation, on the other hand, has a direct 43%-stake aside from the share being held by Philwater Holdings Co. Inc., which is 60% owned by Ayala and 40% by UK-based United Utilities. Other investors in Manila Water include another Japanese giant, Mitsubishi Corp. (8%) and the World Bank’s IFC (6%) as well as First State Investments of the UK (10%), Singapore-based global fund manager Aberdeen Asset Management plc (5%) and US-based equity mutual fund Smallcap World Fund Inc. (5%).
Daang matuwid pa ba when big business is practically running the government and profiting immensely at the expense of the people? Water rates today are about 585% to 1,119% higher than the initial rates when MWSS was privatized. Our water bill is now among the most expensive in Asia. Still, we face more increases that the Aquino administration will allow despite the harsh impact on the people and despite rising poverty and joblessness.
The Aquino administration, Maynilad and Manila Water must be held accountable for exploiting and oppressing the consumers. We have to end the greed of the Big Water monopolies of Ayala and Pangilinan and their foreign partners, and reverse the anti-people policy of MWSS privatization. (END)
With the rapid and steady decline of the domestic labor market, labor export has further intensified under Aquino who deploys an average of 1.58 million OFWs a year, a significant jump from the 1 million during Arroyo’s term. If you stretch the comparison to the 1980s, the country is exporting about 3-4 times more OFWs today. In addition, OFW deployment relative to the number of domestically employed workers has steadily increased through the years – from just 2.9% in 2001 to 4.5% in 2011 – indicating the deepening reliance on labor export of the Philippines.
Their remittances (which for the first time breached the $20-billion mark in 2011 and as of September 2012 is reported at $15.57 billion but expected by the World Bank to reach a new record high of $24 billion for the full year) have been keeping the economy afloat in the past three decades by providing means for domestic consumption and payments for our import-dependent production (trade deficit stood at $6.8 billion as of October) and massive foreign debt (pegged at $61.72 billion as of September, which is also the quick and straight answer to one of the favorite 2012 highlights of the administration – the Philippines supposedly being a creditor nation).
In fact, while exports and FDI inflows have increased this year, OFW remittances, the third largest in the world behind remittances from Chinese and Mexican migrant workers, remained the single largest source of dollars for the economy. In the past 10 years, annual OFW remittances are almost 90 times the size of net FDI while the trade balance, as in previous decades, remained perennially in the red, meaning that the neocolonial import-export sector continues to take out invaluable resources from the country, while others in the region like Indonesia, Malaysia, South Korea and Singapore are posting trade surplus of between $25 to $43 billion. Like neocolonial trade, labor export actually takes away more from the economy than the remittances it brings as highly-skilled and trained Filipino workers render their productivity to foreign economies instead of ours. The social costs of labor export such as disintegrating families, issues left unmeasured by statistics, should not be ignored as well.
While actually symptomatic of the permanent and structural crisis that forever besets the Philippines, labor export and remittances drive “growth” as measured by the GDP. This is perhaps one of the biggest anomalies of our maldevelopment. The surprising third quarter expansion, for instance, was mainly driven among others by the 24.3% growth in construction gross value-added (GVA) and 24.8% growth in construction expenditure as record-breaking inflows of remittances fuel demand for residential property. The so-called real estate boom is also being pushed by the BPO sector that according to industry insiders has been driving up demand for new office space which is expected to hit a record 400,000 to half a million square meters this year, or an increase of as much as 25% from 2011.
Like labor export, growth stimulated by BPO is an aberration because its predominance in economic production is actually indicative of the country’s continuing failure to develop and industrialize. Both are the results of the domestic economy’s longstanding structural inability to generate sustainable and productive jobs from vibrant local industries including the manufacture of consumer and industrial goods and modernized agriculture. Without a national industrialization plan, we are forced to rely on what the US and other rich countries require us to do for their advanced economies, whether as production workers in their global assembly lines and factories or as call center agents to service the various needs of their clients. Certainly, they do create some (low-paying, insecure) jobs but just enough to meet their needs while the jobs generated are totally detached from our own development needs.
Furthermore, the so-called resilience amid the global crisis is not because the economy is internally-driven by sustainable, job-generating domestic industries but because our main drivers of growth – BPO and labor export – are precisely useful cost-cutting schemes for the crisis-hit economies of the First World to cope with the economic crunch. In other words, we may continue to “grow” amid the global crisis, but at the great expense of our workers who will be forced to accept further exploitative arrangements in the form of more depressed wages and lack of social protection whether as an irregular call center agent here or an undocumented migrant worker in the US.
At our expense
“Growth” indeed has been at our expense. Not only is the supposed growth not creating enough jobs, it is also being pushed by skyrocketing costs of basic needs and vital economic services. At current prices, electricity, gas and water grew the second fastest in the third quarter among all major industries, just behind construction as the year as usual saw the regular rate increases in privatized electricity and water. While this meant additional burden for the public, it meant more profits for the private corporations that control them.
These utilities are controlled by the country’s richest clans and individuals who are closely associated with Aquino such as presidential uncle Danding Cojuangco and political supporters Manny Pangilinan and the Ayala family. Aside from electricity and water utilities, they also control other key infrastructure such as toll roads, telecoms and power generation. Together with other close Aquino allies like the Lopezes, Aboitizes and Consunjis, among others, these groups have positioned themselves to further expand their business empire through Aquino’s PPP scheme.
The much ballyhooed credit rating upgrades are also being achieved at the people’s expense. Credit rating agencies cite the fiscal reforms being undertaken by Aquino that tame the national budget deficit. This includes, among others, raising government fees and imposing new charges through Administrative Order (AO) No. 31 and imposing more taxes like the newly-signed Sin Tax Law to generate additional revenues. Most of these revenues, however, will go to debt servicing as Aquino needs to gain favorable reviews from creditors and credit rating agencies.
Since Aquino took over up to September this year, government has already shelled out ₱1.59 trillion for debt servicing, equivalent to 70.2% of total revenues and 53.3% of total expenditures plus principal amortization. For comparison, debt servicing under Arroyo was equivalent to 65.8% of revenues and 41.5% of expenditures. These belie claims that the national budget under the Aquino administration is now being redirected towards social services to empower and benefit the poor. The expenditure program from 2011 to the recently signed ₱2-trillion 2013 national budget shows that the budget for debt servicing (including principal amortization) is equivalent to an average of 2.5 times that of the budget for education; 6.4 times, health; and 11.2 times, housing.
For elite interests
While the Aquino administration is harping on good governance as being behind the supposed drastic economic turnaround, much of the so-called reforms it is undertaking – with substantial backing from the US government and multilateral institutions like the World Bank – have been more about protecting elite and big business interests and less about curbing big-time systemic corruption or democratizing government. The reforms are all about creating a more conducive atmosphere for investors, i.e. stable and predictable policy environment, less business risks and reduced costs, etc. to reinforce liberalization, deregulation and privatization. The false assumption is that when business is thriving, the people will ultimately benefit through more jobs and income opportunities and improved living conditions. But clearly, this is not happening as the gains from a supposedly expanding economy have remained monopolized by a handful of big local businessmen and their foreign partners and funders.
On top of promoting the interests of big business, the good governance rhetoric is also being used to advance the agenda of the Aquino clique of the political elite. The successful ouster of Renato Corona as Supreme Court (SC) Chief Justice and the appointment of Ma. Lourdes Sereneo, for instance, were more about the consolidation of the political power of the ruling Liberal Party (LP) than making Mrs. Arroyo accountable. Executive hegemony over government branches that formulate policies (Congress) and review the legality of such policies (Judiciary) makes an even more ideal political setting to push for retrogressive economic programs that promote certain big business interests.
In the run-up to the 2013 midterm polls, the LP further heightened their political consolidation under the guise of daang matuwid. Aquino appointed Grace Padaca to the Commission on Elections (Comelec) while LP President and 2016 presidential wannabe Mar Roxas is leading the campaign to unseat non-LP governors in the vote-rich provinces of Cebu and Pangasinan through his powerful post as Secretary of the Department of Interior and Local Government (DILG). The LP is obviously laying the groundwork for their prolonged rule and continued imposition of their brand of elite governance and economics beyond the 2016 term of Aquino.
However, contradictions will surely heighten as the crisis gripping the great majority of Filipinos intensifies. The deception of good governance is good economics and the popularity of Aquino will certainly reach their threshold if joblessness, poverty and hunger continued to deteriorate. The significant 12-point drop in Aquino’s latest satisfaction rating despite the scorching speed of GDP growth could be a portent of things to come. ###