Privatization, Water crisis

Questions on Manila Water’s compensation

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Still reeling from public backlash, Manila Water will now “voluntarily” compensate consumers affected by the water supply interruptions. The estimate is that the initial compensation will cost the Ayala firm Php150 million. That obviously is merely a drop in the ocean of Manila Water profits, so to speak. In 2018, it reported a net income of Php6.5 billion.

Everyone – including the senators, congressmen and even the MWSS chief regulator – is saying that Manila Water’s offer is not enough. There should be a rebate, per the concession agreement. Manila Water claims it will cooperate with regulators.

While efforts to make Manila Water to account are commendable, and recent developments on demands for compensation are welcome as immediate relief especially for poor consumers, important questions remain:

(1) How about Manila Water customers, or even Maynilad’s for that matter, who have been without 24/7 water supply even BEFORE the artificial water shortage happened? They number about 300,000, based on the private concessionaires’ own reports. Aren’t they entitled to compensation and rebate, too?

(2) If the basis of the compensation is the failure of Manila Water to fulfill its contractual obligations, who is accounting for more than 20 years of failure and neglect of BOTH Manila Water and Maynilad under MWSS privatization?

(3) If public pressure succeeds in seeking reasonable and just compensation – if there is ever such a thing for depriving people something as very basic as water in the name of profits – from Manila Water, does it mean water privatization actually works and all it takes is a vigilant public and effective regulator? ###

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Privatization, Water crisis

Privatization is creating an artificial water shortage

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(Photo: Inquirer.net)

First published by Bulatlat

Metro Manila’s supposed water crisis is one that is not caused by lack of supply and new water sources, or as some would argue, by lack of foresight and preparations by regulators and Manila Water. Rather, it is caused by lack of effective state control over water resources after government allowed the privatization of Metro Manila’s water system 22 years ago.

There lies the artificial water shortage.

By official accounts, the available supply for Metro Manila’s water needs is still enough. But instead of taking on the role of ensuring that this water reaches the people for their basic domestic use, government has deferred to two separate private companies (Manila Water and Maynilad), each with their own profit motives and considerations, in determining how water reaches the end-consumers through their separate distribution networks.

Worse, these private concessionaires have not improved the infrastructure enough to maximize existing water supply despite massive increases in their rates (and profits) for the past two decades. Imagine this – every day, about 1,177 million liters of water are lost due mainly to defective infrastructure. That’s equivalent to almost eight times of the supposed deficit in water supply that Manila Water is grappling with.

As it is, according to the concessionaires’ own performance reports, almost 300,000 people in their service areas are already without 24-hour water supply even before the current supply issues began early this month. That is the “normal” situation for these people under the regime of privatized water. The actual figures could be higher, as government regulators do not seem to verify – or do not have the capacity to check – the performance of the concessionaires.

Both Manila Water and Maynilad source the water they distribute from Angat dam that based on official pronouncements still holds enough water to supply the needs of the capital region and nearby areas. Angat dam supplies 4,000 million liters per day (MLD) or 96% of Metro Manila’s water (the rest come from Laguna Lake, 3% and deep wells, 1%).

But while Manila Water has a deficit, Maynilad has surplus supply. How did that happen? When the Ramos government privatized the Metropolitan Waterworks and Sewerage System (MWSS) in 1997, its service area was divided into two and then bid out to private companies. The east zone was won by Manila Water and the west zone, by Maynilad.

As part of the concession agreement, Maynilad will get 60% of Angat’s raw water and Manila Water the remaining 40 percent. That translates to 2,400 MLD for Maynilad and 1,600 MLD for Manila Water. The said sharing arrangement was based on the population size of the concession areas awarded to them by government. At present, Maynilad services around 9.5 million people in the west zone and Manila Water, 6.8 million in the east zone.

The 150-MLD challenge

Manila Water claims that its 1,600 MLD from Angat is no longer enough as its requirements already rose to as high as 1,750 MLD. The 150-MLD deficit is being blamed for the water supply interruptions that have been affecting some half a million people in the east zone.

This reported increased demand from Manila Water’s customers could have been easily met if the government were in charge of water management and distribution. Under the present privatized setup, water that flows to Metro Manila is divided to the concession areas of Manila Water and Maynilad, and this creates unnecessary challenges for an effective and responsive mechanism in water allocation and distribution.

The water flows between the concessionaires are connected through cross-border pipes. As one of the stop gap measures to help address the supposed 150-MLD shortage in the east zone, Maynilad agreed to open some of these cross-border pipes so that 50 MLD of water allocated for the west zone could be directed to Manila Water’s concession areas.

If the MWSS were in charge of water distribution from the start, such option could have been resorted to much earlier and in a manner that is less complicated and bureaucratic (e.g., asking Maynilad’s permission first); more effective (e.g., redirecting more than 50 MLD, if needed); and much faster (e.g., under privatization, most of the cross-border pipes have been already cut and will need time to restore) to avoid the supply woes that tens of thousands of households are being forced to bear today.

Aside from the cross-border pipe arrangement with Maynilad, Manila Water is also expecting to have another 50 MLD from its new treatment plant in Cardona, Rizal (with a maximum capacity of 100 MLD when completed) and a further 100 MLD from existing deep wells.

Missing water

What is not highlighted amid all the frenzy in securing additional supply is the more than a billion liters of water wasted daily, mostly from leakages in the existing distribution infrastructure of Maynilad and Manila Water, or what the water industry calls non-revenue water (NRW).

At present, by MWSS’s own account, the NRW of Manila Water is at 11% while that of Maynilad is at 39 percent. Looking at the volume of water that flows through their respective systems, water losses in Manila Water’s concession area is around 176 MLD and about 1,001 MLD in Maynilad’s for a total of 1,177 MLD.

On its website, Maynilad claims that as of 2018, its NRW is 27.1 percent. On the other hand, Manila Water’s own website claims they deliver 1.3 billion liters out of their 1.6 billion Angat dam allocation, or an NRW of 12 percent. Using these figures, the total volume of water losses from both concessionaires is still huge at 888 MLD.

Based on the original targets when MWSS was privatized, the volume of water losses should have already been reduced to less than a billion liters a day (around 732 to 976 MLD) as early as 2001 or 18 years ago. Instead of the promised reduction, the volume of water losses has increased (per MWSS’s NRW estimates) amid a growing service area that has expanded by about five million people in the past two decades. This even as present all-in rates (i.e., basic charge plus other charges, supposedly to recover investments used to improve water supply) have grown about 3-4 times of their 1997 level in real terms.

Note that Maynilad still has a surplus supply despite wasting more than a billion liters of water per day, while Manila Water, which has a much lower reported NRW than its west zone counterpart suffers a deficit. This further underscores the inefficiency and wastefulness of water resource management and the artificiality of water shortage under MWSS privatization.

The combined water losses of both Manila Water and Maynilad is more than 28% of the estimated current water supply of 4,167 MLD from the Angat dam, Laguna Lake and active deep wells. The MWSS is saying that the international standard is 20% while other studies suggest that the apparent economically reasonable NRW is between 10 and 12 percent.

In any case, halving the current total NRW (as estimated by MWSS) could produce an additional 588 MLD in water supply. It is interesting to note that the controversial Php12.2-billion Chinese-funded Kaliwa dam (which government, using the metro water shortage as pretext, wants rushed amid unmet environmental compliance) has a projected capacity of 600 MLD. In other words, addressing the issue of water losses substantially lessens the pressure of building new dams and avoiding the unnecessary environmental, social and economic costs they entail.

Finding accountability

To be sure, urgent demands to make Manila Water and their operator led by the Ayala group and their foreign partners accountable for the current water woes in Metro Manila are justified and legitimate. But they should be made to account outside the narrow framework of their commitments under the concession agreement (or privatization contract), and instead be held liable in the context of the assertion of people’s rights to water and reversing MWSS privatization.

The privatization contract, by design, heavily favors the private concessionaires. When the World Bank (through the International Finance Corp. or IFC) crafted the concession agreement in 1997, it ensured that the private concessionaires will be able to operate profitably in order to pay back the World Bank and other foreign creditors the hundreds of millions of dollars in debts that MWSS owes them. The IFC itself, as the World Bank’s private investment arm, is an investor in the MWSS privatization through Manila Water. Thus, from the onset, MWSS privatization was never about the provision of water services but the collection of private profits for foreign investors and creditors and their local partners.

The MWSS itself, for instance, is saying that it appears there is nothing in the concession agreement that they can use to penalize Manila Water for causing the current water supply problems in its service area. Regulators claim that they can use the concession agreement’s rate rebasing exercise (when concessionaires ask for higher basic charges) but that will not happen until 2022. There is also no assurance of accountability as Manila Water (as well as Maynilad) could always question and reverse the decision of regulators through an international arbitration mechanism provided under the privatization contract.

Focusing on just Manila Water absolves Maynilad and its operators led by Manny Pangilinan’s group and its Indonesian backers (Salim group) and Japanese investors (Marubeni) of accountability, and reinforces the wrong notion that the issue is simply mismanagement on the part of Manila Water. The prevailing impression today is that Maynilad customers are “fortunate” when in reality, Maynilad’s very high NRW deprives all consumers in Metro Manila and nearby areas of valuable water supply.

Most importantly, it diverts the issue away from privatization as the central issue in, and underlying reason behind, the artificial shortage. As such, it also has the effect of absolving government of responsibility when in fact, the biggest accountability in all this lies with government for abandoning its duty to ensure water for the people.

As long as water remains in the hands of unaccountable, profit-oriented private and foreign interests, the people of Metro Manila and adjacent provinces will continue to face insecurity in supply amid ever skyrocketing rates. This is the real water crisis that we face, and one that is permanent – El Niño or not – as long as there is no policy shift in the way that water resources are managed. ###

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Economy, Oil deregulation, Privatization

“Red October” Day 1: What’s destabilizing the Duterte regime?

(Photo from AP/Bullit Marquez/The Philippine Star)

It’s “Red October” Day 1. Who or what is destabilizing the Duterte government today?

The oil companies. Oil firms announced that they will be implementing another round of oil price hikes starting Oct 1. Pilipinas Shell is hiking its LPG (liquefied petroleum gas) price by about Php2.36 per kilogram (kg) while Petron Corp. will also increase by Php2.35. These translate to an increase of almost Php26 for an 11-kg cylinder tank usually used by households. Including the previous increases since Pres. Duterte took over, LPG prices have already ballooned by an estimated Php216 to Php246. Further, starting Oct 2, oil firms will also implement a big-time price hike for diesel, gasoline and kerosene. Oil companies already announced that they will hike the price of diesel by Php1.35 per liter; gasoline, Php1.00; and kerosene, Php1.10. This will be the eighth straight week of unabated oil price hikes and would be the 28th overall for the year. Since Duterte became President, the price of diesel has already soared by more than Php20 per liter (Php13.50 this year alone) and gasoline by more than Php19 per liter (Php13.37 this year). (Read more on the latest oil price hikes here.)

The private water concessionaires of the MWSS (Metropolitan Waterworks and Sewerage System). Starting Oct 1, Maynilad Water Services Inc. will be billing its customers an additional Php0.90 per cubic meter for its basic charge under its rebased rates approved by the MWSS-Regulatory Office. This is on top of the Php0.11 per cubic meter increase due to the quarterly foreign currency differential adjustment (FCDA). Manila Water Corp.’s basic rates will likewise increase by Php1.46 per cubic meter due to rate rebasing while it will charge an extra Php0.02 per cubic meter due to the FCDA. Both rate rebasing and FCDA are mechanisms created under the privatization of MWSS that allow the private water concessionaires to adjust rates in order to pass on to the consumers all the costs of running the water services system and at the same time guarantee their profits. The rate hikes this “Red October” under the rate rebasing are just the first in four installments of increases with the three others to be implemented in Jan 2020, Jan 2021 and Jan 2022 – the second half of the Duterte presidency (that is if he is still in power).

Earlier, the Department of Economic Research of the Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas (BSP) has estimated that inflation for September could reach 6.8%, with a range of 6.3% and as high as 7.1 percent. If the central bank’s forecast happens, this would be the ninth straight month of accelerated inflation and will be the highest in nine years. Pres. Duterte’s economic managers have repeatedly assured the public that inflation will ease in the latter part of 2018. But with the continued climb in oil prices, water rates, food prices (made worse by the impact of typhoon Ompong that destroyed almost Php27 billion worth of crops) and other basic goods and services, this appears to be a very optimistic forecast.

Rising prices and the inability or outright refusal of the Duterte administration to reverse current policies that allow unabated price hikes such as oil deregulation and water privatization, as well as its continued insistence on additional taxes under the TRAIN (Tax Reform for Acceleration and Inclusion) that further bloat prices are fueling social unrest and instability. The latest Pulse Asia survey showed that rising prices are the most urgent concern of Filipinos along with other economic concerns such as increasing workers’ pay, reducing poverty and creating more jobs.

As it hunts for “Red October”, the Duterte administration should look at itself instead, and not at the communists and their supposed co-plotters. Apparently, its own economic policies – together with its repressive schemes – are the ones destabilizing and isolating the regime. ###

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Economy, Privatization

‘Dutertenomics’: golden age of oligarchic and foreign interests in infrastructure?

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Duterte’s economic managers present “Dutertenomics” – a grand plan that they said will usher in a “golden age of infrastructure” (Photo by Marianne Bermudez/Inquirer.net)

Build, build, build” is said to be the foundation of the Duterte administration’s development plan, which his economic managers are packaging as “Dutertenomics”. The plan is supposed to usher in a “golden age of infrastructure”.

But despite the attempt at branding, Dutertenomics is neither new nor unique. Its cornerstone of massive infrastructure development is still built on the neoliberal agenda of opening up additional profit-making prospects for big local and foreign business, including through “development” lending, building and operating the infrastructure themselves and/or constructing facilities that would benefit their commercial interests.

Worse, the ambitious plan may not usher in a golden age of infrastructure but instead a golden age of oligarchic and foreign interests in infrastructure while the public bears more onerous financial burden arising from greater debts and taxes.

AmBisyon Natin

There is no denying of the urgent and huge infrastructure needs of the country, especially transport. The Philippines has the worst overall infrastructure and worst transport infrastructure (roads, railroads, port and air transport) among major countries in Southeast Asia, according to the 2015-2016 Global Competitiveness Report of the World Economic Forum (WEF). The intolerable traffic in Metro Manila and the state of disrepair of the public transport system illustrate the dismal shape of transport infrastructure in the country.

Thus, infrastructure, specifically the transport sector, has been made the cornerstone of Dutertenomics. It is a key component of AmBisyon Natin 2040, a vision to make the Philippines a “prosperous, predominantly middle-class society” that President Rodrigo Duterte has adopted as guide for long-term national development planning.

AmBisyon Natin listed priority sectors that include the development of infrastructure such as roads, ports, airports, bridges and communication (“Connectivity”) as well as housing and urban development. It also identified “investment in high-quality infrastructure to make the cost of moving people, goods and services competitive” as one of the policy instruments to make the aspirations of AmBisyon Natin a reality.

The Philippine Development Plan (PDP) 2017-2022 is the first medium-term plan anchored on AmBisyon Natin. Under this PDP, the Duterte administration aims to make its six-year term the so-called “golden age of infrastructure” with spending on infrastructure increasing substantially (i.e. 5.1% of gross domestic product or GDP in 2016 to 7.4% in 2022). Concrete and measurable indicators have been set for transport infrastructure (road, rail, air and water transport); water and power resources; and social infrastructure (classrooms, health centers, housing units).

(Download the PDP’s Chapter 1 – Introduction and Chapter 19 – Accelerating Infrastructure Development)

The “golden age of infrastructure” includes an initial list of 64 big-ticket projects for implementation or in the pipeline that are mostly transport infrastructure such as major road networks, railway systems, bus rapid transit systems, and airport and seaport modernization. These are on top of 15 ongoing infrastructure projects, which are either locally funded, with official development assistance (ODA), or through public-private partnership (PPP).

Hybrid and unsolicited PPP

PPP, which is essentially the neoliberal privatization of infrastructure development and commercialization of services, will continue to be the main program to meet the country’s infrastructure needs. The PDP will promote PPP by addressing “bottlenecks in PPP planning and implementation” and pursuing “reforms to enhance the business environment” to encourage investors. To do these, among the legislative agenda under the PDP is the amendment of the BOT Law and its implementing rules and regulations (IRR).

In the previous Aquino administration, such policy reform has taken the form of the PPP Act that will among others institutionalize state guarantees on financial and regulatory risks of PPP projects. (Read “Aquino’s PPP legacy”) In the current 17th Congress, bills to introduce the PPP Act and BOT Law amendment have already been filed in both chambers. At the Senate, Sen. Sonny Angara filed Senate Bill (SB) No. 951 (“PPP Act”) while at the House of Representatives Rep. Vilma Santos-Recto filed a counterpart proposal (House Bill or HB No. 1944). HB 2727 of Magdalo party-list Rep. Gary Alejano, meanwhile, aims to amend the BOT Law. There are also moves to introduce foreign investment liberalization through the PPP Act.

As of March 28, there are 15 awarded PPP projects worth Php310.51 billion, based on the latest status report of the PPP Center. Of these, four are completed and operational (Php31.77 billion); seven are under construction (Php150.01 billion); and four are under pre-construction (Php128.73).

The country’s richest and most influential oligarchs control these PPP projects. The San Miguel Corp. (SMC) group accounts for 45.9% of the total cost of ongoing and/or completed PPP projects as of March 2017. The Manny V. Pangilinan (MVP) and Ayala tandem, meanwhile, comprises 21.5% on top of MVP’s own projects comprising 18.9 percent. All in all, the SMC, MVP, and Ayala groups collectively control 10 of the 15 ongoing and/or completed PPP projects worth Php275.15 billion or equivalent to 88.6% of the total cost. (See Chart)

Blog 05 Dutertenomics infrastructure Chart

These same oligarchs are positioning themselves to corner more infrastructure projects as the Duterte administration promotes unsolicited projects and the so-called hybrid PPPs to push its grand infrastructure plan.

Unsolicited projects proposed by the big oligarchs now total Php2.6 trillion, mostly in the transport sector as they see opportunity in the traffic crisis. These big oligarchs take advantage of unsolicited projects to build infrastructure that they will not only profit from but would also benefit their other business interests (e.g. SM’s unsolicited proposal to build a Php25-billion toll road that will link its malls in Pasay and Makati). This further weakens the central role that government should be playing in rationally planning and deciding which key infrastructure projects are needed, where to put them, and how they serve the overall development plan.

Hybrid PPP, on the other hand, is a worse form of PPP because it puts even heavier load on the public sector than the already onerous burden it shoulders under a regular PPP. In a regular PPP, the private sector will raise funds to build the infrastructure, and then operate and maintain (O&M) it in a fixed period to recover investments and earn profits. In a hybrid PPP, the public sector will finance the construction of the infrastructure through official development assistance (ODA) loans and then give the O&M to the private sector. The public will thus be burdened with direct debt servicing for the ODA loans (in a regular PPP, debt is often a contingent liability), profit guarantees and other perks for the private operator, and high user fees.

With preference for unsolicited projects and hybrid PPP, and the pending Traffic Emergency Bill – supposedly meant to address the traffic crisis – the stage to favor certain big oligarchs is set. With emergency or special powers, the Executive could fast track the implementation of transport infrastructure projects through negotiated contracts in the pretext of solving the urgent traffic crisis.

Increased foreign role

Meanwhile, as bilateral relations with China warm up under Duterte, the administration is actively seeking Chinese financing for big-ticket infrastructure projects through bilateral ODA loans, as well as multilaterally through the China-led Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB), to fulfill the so-called “golden age of infrastructure”.

Reports say that China is set to finance Php172.4-billion worth of infrastructure projects this year. This is part of the 15 projects identified for Chinese financing under the Duterte administration estimated at a total of $6.96 billion (Php349.92 billion). Earlier reports indicated that one of the projects that China will finance is the South Line of the North-South Railway Project (NSRP) for $3.01 billion (Php151.33 billion). China also expressed initial interest in bankrolling “Duterte’s dream” of Php218-billion, 830-kilometer Mindanao railway system.

Aside from China, other imperialist financial institutions are also lining up to fund Duterte’s “golden age of infrastructure”, also mostly in the transport sector. The Japan International Cooperation Agency (JICA) has committed to finance three mega-transport projects with a combined cost of $8.8 billion (Php442.42 billion). Eleven other projects are being pitched as well to Japan for possible funding including irrigation and flood control projects. These projects are: $4.3-billion initial phase of the Mega Metro Manila subway system connecting FTI in Taguig City to the SM North EDSA and Trinoma malls in Quezon City; the $2.7-billion commuter line extending to Los Baños, Laguna, the south line of the North-South railway project, and the $1.9-billion high-speed rail extending to the soon-to-rise Clark Green City of the North-South Commuter Railway connecting Tutuban in Manila and Malolos, Bulacan.

The US-controlled World Bank, on the other hand, is providing $64.6 million (Php3.25 billion) for the first line of the Metro Manila bus rapid transit (BRT) system.

With increased ODA borrowing to fund infrastructure development, Duterte’s economic team has been pushing for a package of tax reforms that would be shouldered more heavily by the poor and ordinary income earners. The tax reform package entails additional burden that includes higher value-added tax (VAT), expanded and higher excise tax on all petroleum products, as well as the sugar excise tax. While the poor bear the brunt of these reforms, the rich get tax benefits such as lower corporate income tax as well as tax cuts in real estate and property-related transactions. And these rich include the oligarchs that corner the infrastructure projects (including those to be funded by ODA) the costs of which the taxpaying public will shoulder.

In addition to financing PPP projects, increased role for foreign interests is expected as the push to further liberalize infrastructure development continues. The US, for instance, has renewed calls to lift constitutional restrictions on foreign investments to allow and encourage American firms to participate in the Duterte administration’s PPP program. Another route being promoted by the US for American involvement in PPP is through the relaxation of limits set under the Foreign Investment Negative List (FINL). Meanwhile, Duterte himself has said that he is supportive of lifting constitutional limits on foreign investments through Charter change (Cha-cha).

Already, the PPP Center under the current administration has launched a UK-funded (Php4.35 million) Development of Foreign Investment Framework Project that “will facilitate the legal and institutional push to further build a favorable PPP business environment for foreign investors”. The output of this project will be translated into inputs to the PPP Act and its IRR.

Another pending legislative proposal to allow full foreign participation in key infrastructure sectors is HB 446 that seeks to amend the Public Service Act and redefine public utility. When passed, it will open telecommunications, transport and power industries to 100% foreign ownership.

Policy issue of profit-driven infrastructure

Ongoing PPP/infrastructure/transport projects continue to burden the people. The Php62.7-billion MRT-7 project (SMC) – the second largest among active PPP projects – for instance, is fraught with onerous contractual terms that are disadvantageous to taxpayers (state guarantees on private debt, amortization payments, etc.) and end-users (guaranteed fare adjustments) while causing massive displacement among urban poor and farmer communities. The same thing is true with the LRT-1 (MVP-Ayala) PPP project. (Read “How MVP-Ayala will squeeze LRT 1 commuters dry”)

Ultimately, it all goes back to the policy issue of private sector and profit-driven infrastructure development that the so-called Dutertenomics promote. The country needs to urgently address its infrastructure crisis but as IBON has repeatedly raised in the past, infrastructure development for transport as well other key sectors carried out with profit-driven agenda contradicts and undermines the role of infrastructure in improving the living condition of the people and serving the overall economic development and general public interests of the country. ###

This article was first published as IBON Features

(Exchange rate used: Php50.2752 per US dollar, March 2017 average, BSP – http://www.bsp.gov.ph/statistics/spei_new/tab12_pus.htm)

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2016 elections, Cronyism & patronage, Privatization

#BeyondElections2016: PPP investors bet on presidential bets

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Infographic from IBON Foundation

All presidential bets vow that they will continue and improve the public-private partnership program (PPP) of the Aquino administration. This, of course, is not a surprise. Oligarchs who bag these contracts and profit from infrastructure development are also the biggest backers of leading presidential bets.

Take San Miguel Corporation, for example. The diversified conglomerate admitted that it has been lending its private jets to some 2016 bets for their campaigning. SMC has already cornered four PPP contracts worth more than Php49 billion.

These include the Php24.4-billion Bulacan Bulk Water Supply Project and Php17.93-billion NAIA Expressway Phase 2 Project under the Aquino administration; and the Php69.3-billion MRT Line 7 Project and Php37.43-billion Metro Manila Skyway Stage 3 Project under the previous Arroyo administration.

San Miguel is eyeing another Php489.58 billion worth of PPP projects, which may be auctioned in the remaining months of the Aquino presidency or early on in the administration of the next President.

It’s how bureaucrat capitalism works. Oligarchs back presidential bids as “investment” and rake profits later through government contracts such as PPPs.

This reality is prominent in the upcoming polls as candidates assure investors, including foreign interests behind privatized infrastructure development, of PPP continuity. The only competition now is who among the presidential contenders will implement most efficiently the incumbent’s centerpiece economic program.

PPP delays

Opposition bets use the horrendous traffic in Metro Manila amid delayed transportation projects to stress the failures of the Aquino administration. Vice President Jejomar Binay, for instance, calls Aquino’s PPP program as “epicenter of failure”. For the aspirant who poll surveys say is the man to beat, the main issue is the “inexplicable delays” in the PPP program.

So far, Aquino has already awarded 12 PPP projects with a combined cost of Php196.53 billion. The amount is based on the PPP Center’s report as of 1 April 2016.

But out of the 12 awarded contracts, government has completed just two projects. These are the Php2.01-billion Daang Hari – SLEX Link Road Project and the Php16.43-billion PPP for School Infrastructure Project (PSIP) Phase I. One of the awarded contracts – the Php8.69-billion Modernization of the Philippine Orthopedic Center – even got derailed. This after the investor backed out citing delays in the release of certificate of possession for the project site.

Presidential bets promise to fast track the implementation of the PPP program. One is Senator Grace Poe who is neck and neck with Binay in the surveys. Poe claimed that when elected, she would finish seven airports through PPP in the first half of her term. These airport projects are in various stages of bidding under Aquino’s PPP program.

Poll uncertainties

Candidates are pressed to have greater clarity in their economic plans especially on PPP to assure interest groups like banks and investors. The Institute of International Finance (IIF), for example, said that compared to Poe and administration bet Mar Roxas, Binay is more populist. Thus, Binay could undermine the PPP program.

Responding to the US-based lobby group, the Vice President’s camp asserted they would, in fact, enhance the PPP program. A Binay presidency, they said, will revise the Build-Operate-Transfer (BOT) Law, pass a Right-of-Way bill, and address bureaucratic inefficiencies to hasten PPP implementation.

Indeed, the PPP program’s fate is one of the main concerns of the business community as the country transitions from the current administration to the next. For instance, the Philippine Chamber of Commerce and Industry (PCCI) asked Aquino to accelerate the implementation of PPP projects in the remainder of his term. PCCI said this will ensure that the next President can “hit the ground running” in terms of infrastructure development.

But the business community is also wary of political risks. Historically, pet infrastructure projects of the incumbent administration, when replaced by the opposing camp, are either delayed or totally scrapped. This early, the American Chamber of Commerce of the Philippines is urging the succeeding regime to continue “all properly awarded” PPP projects.

Contracts are often reviewed supposedly to protect public interest. In reality, however, the intention is to favor other business interests that have closer ties to the newly installed political camp.

The LRT-MRT common station controversy is illustrative of this. The common station was originally located near Henry Sy’s SM City – North EDSA in a deal forged during the Arroyo administration. It was part of the Php69.3-billion MRT Line 7 Project. But when Aquino took over, the station was moved to the TriNoma mall of the Ayala group, bundled with the LRT 1 project.

Assuring investors

Nonetheless, investors are practically assured of the PPP program’s continuity even with Aquino bet Roxas lagging behind in surveys. For one, PPP projects are exempted from the poll ban on public works, said the Commission on Elections (Comelec). This means that scheduled bidding of some projects will proceed as planned. The PPP Center targets to award at least three more contracts before Aquino steps down.

Further, top presidential runners have already said they would not just continue the program but also improve its execution. All candidates have committed as well to increase infrastructure spending from 4% to 5% of gross domestic product (GDP). This includes the budget to protect PPP investors from political and economic risks.

The administration is also moving to guarantee investors the program will not be easily reversed by whoever will come into power. Aquino already certified as urgent the proposed PPP Law to expedite it in Congress before the polls. The bill would consolidate, institutionalize and expand the PPP reforms started by Aquino, which are feared to undercut public interest. Among them is further weakening public institutions that regulate private investments.

Indeed, the coming election is crucial for PPP investors. The next administration will oversee the implementation of awarded contracts and steering rest of the projects lined up under the program. These include mega-projects such as the Php122.8-billion Laguna Lakeshore Expressway Dike Project and the Php170.7-billion North-South Railway Project (South Line).

Contracts of such magnitude require a government that is able to address regulatory and commercial risks, noted the International Finance Corporation (IFC). The World Bank investment arm also said that greater foreign participation must be encouraged. Thus, foreign and local business groups and creditors are closely watching how contenders will handle PPP issues like regulatory risk guarantees and more liberalization of infrastructure development.

Candidates court ordinary people for votes. However, no one talks about how they will continue to bear an increasing burden to promote the commercial viability of PPP projects. No one is confronting the flawed policy that has raised user fees in water services, power rates, transportation fares, toll fees, telecommunication rates, etc. No one is raising the issue of how privatized infrastructure and services remain dismal amid skyrocketing profits of a handful business groups. ###

(This post is an updated version of the article “Presidential bets vow PPP continuity amid business, foreign lobby” that was first published as IBON Features)

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Privatization, SONA 2015

SONA 2015: Aquino’s PPP legacy

(Short video produced by AlterMidya)

First published as IBON Features

“We have so many needs: from education, infrastructure, health, military, police and more. Our funds will not be enough to meet them… Our solution: public-private partnerships… From these public-private partnerships, our economy will grow and every Filipino will be the beneficiary… We will be able to fund public service in accordance with our platform.” 

– President Benigno S. Aquino III, State of the Nation Address (SONA), 26 July 2010

Five SONAs ago, President Aquino declared public-private partnership (PPP) as the key to many of the country’s needs. Ten PPP awarded projects worth Php168.9 billion later and one SONA left to give, how did Aquino’s centerpiece program fare? (An updated report – as of 22 July 2015 – from the PPP Center now pegs the total cost at Php189 billion, reflecting the Php20.1-billion adjustment in the cost of the Cavite-Laguna Expressway from Php35.4 billion to Php55.5 billion)

Aquino has been often criticized for the slow progress of his flagship infrastructure program. There are 15 more PPP projects under various stages of bidding with an indicative cost of Php549.4 billion. Measured against this, Aquino has only awarded 40% of the total number of projects identified. They are equivalent to less than a quarter of the overall indicative cost. Aquino, however, claims that with 10 awarded projects, his administration has already surpassed the six solicited PPP projects of the past three administrations.

Before he steps down, Aquino aims to award five more PPP items. The largest is the Php122.8-billion Laguna Lakeshore Expressway Dike. Like others in the PPP portfolio, the bid schedule for this mega-project has been moved by several months. As such, doubts persist on meeting the target of 15 awarded PPP projects.

But the number of contracts Aquino has sealed will not define his PPP legacy. His biggest contribution is the kind of PPP environment that his regime has began to build. Aquino made a three-decade old neoliberal scheme even more desirable to the local oligarchs and their foreign backers. He has paved the way for more and bigger privatization deals for his successor. Twenty-seven more projects in various stages of pre-bidding preparations are in the pipeline of the PPP Center.

The country, in fact, is recognized globally for its PPP program. UK-based Economist Intelligence Unit (EIU) recently named the Philippines as the “most improved country in Asia Pacific for PPP readiness”. Aquino’s reforms led to distinctions as “most-improved regulatory and institutional frameworks” and “improved investment climate and financial facilities”. Aquino made this possible through perks and guarantees unprecedented in the history of privatization in the Philippines.

Creating the most favorable climate for private investors has been one of the earliest and top concerns of Aquino. Less than a year into his term, economic managers started conducting consultations with business groups and foreign aid agencies on revising the Implementing Rules and Regulations (IRR) of the BOT Law.

Approved in October 2012, the revised IRR introduced new provisions that make the PPP program more palatable to private business. Chief of them are explicit provisions guaranteeing that PPP proponents will be able to collect the contractually agreed fees or charges that they can impose on the public, regardless of regulatory intervention that may affect (i.e. lower) such fees or charges.

This is contained both in the context of granting final approval of grant of the franchise by the regulator and of regulatory determination of tolls, fees, rentals and charges that the proponent can charge to the public. Such government guarantee is absent in the old 2006 IRR.

Back in November 2010 at the international PPP Summit that government organized, Aquino referred to this as “regulatory risk guarantee”. Before 200 foreign businessmen, Aquino said, “When government commits to allow investors to earn their return from user fees, it is important that that commitment be reliable and enforceable. And if private investors are impeded from collecting contractually agreed fees – by regulators, courts, or the legislature – then our government will use its own resources to ensure that they are kept whole.”

An example is the so-called Deficit Payment scheme in the Concession Agreement (CA) Aquino signed with the consortium of Ayala and Pangilinan for the Php64.9-billion LRT Line 1 Cavite Extension and Operation & Maintenance project. The LRT 1 Deficit Payment scheme states that government will shoulder the disparity between the Notional Fare, which the Ayala-Pangilinan group is entitled to impose under the CA, and the Approved Fare that the Light Rail Transit Authority (LRTA) may grant.

Aquino likewise issued Executive Order (EO) No. 78 in July 2012 that mandates the use of Alternative Dispute Resolution (ADR) in all PPP contracts. ADR provides for alternative avenues outside of court to settle disputes or conflicts, which may arise during the contract lifetime of a PPP project. ADR includes conciliation and negotiation, mediation and arbitration. ADR makes for a more inviting climate for investors. Costs are shared and investors have a say in the final decision. The process is also less tedious since watchful and assertive public interest groups are shut out unlike in regular judicial courts or public hearings.

The arbitration mechanism in the CA of the Metropolitan Waterworks and Sewerage System (MWSS) with the Ayala and Pangilinan-led concessionaires is a form of ADR. Under it, investors and regulators sit down in a panel to settle dispute away from any form of public scrutiny, much less participation. The LRT 1 PPP contract also contains a provision on ADR.

The worst of Aquino’s PPP reforms, however, are yet to come. As a “continuing legacy for the people”, Aquino seeks to pass the PPP Act that will amend the 26-year old BOT Law. Lobbying for the PPP Act are the Joint Foreign Chambers in the Philippines (JFC) and the Makati Business Club (MBC). The bill has already been approved by the House committee on public works and highways. It is currently pending at the appropriations panel which will discuss the bill’s funding provisions.

When passed, the PPP Act will consolidate, institutionalize and expand the already outrageously investor-friendly reforms Aquino has initiated. Aside from institutionalizing EO 78 on the ADR, for instance, the PPP Act will also substantially further weaken the courts and regulatory bodies by directly restricting their mandate.

The PPP Act will disallow courts from issuing temporary restraining orders (TROs), preliminary injunctions and preliminary mandatory injunctions against practically all PPP-related acts. Court officials who will violate this would be expelled from the judiciary and face criminal and civil liabilities. While the Supreme Court (SC) can still issue a TRO, etc. against a PPP project, such order will only be effective for a maximum of six months.

Aside from weakening established judicial and regulatory processes that the public can resort to for protection, the PPP Act will also guarantee that public funds are available to protect the commercial interests of investors. It will ensure, for instance, that funds are accessible to finance government obligations arising from regulatory risk guarantees like LRT 1’s Deficit Payment Scheme through a Viability Gap Funding (VGF).

Moreover, the PPP Act will also institutionalize a Contingent Liabilities Fund (CLF) to be funded by foreign debt and local resources. Permanently appropriated, the CLF will ensure a steady source of public funds to meet government’s financial obligations arising from PPP contracts. Such obligations include performance undertaking where government guarantees payments for debts incurred by the private investor. One of the PPP projects that enjoy performance undertaking is the Php69.3-billion MRT 7 of presidential uncle Danding Cojuangco.

Remember the Ramos sweetheart deals with independent power producers (IPPs) that until today bleed the National Power Corporation (Napocor) dry? Those are also examples of PPP-related contingent liabilities. In 2011, the public debt arising from such liabilities still stood at US$16.73 billion despite a staggering debt servicing of US$18 billion since 2001.

Like his predecessors, Aquino justifies PPP because of limited public funds. But his proposed PPP Act will even further worsen government’s fiscal woes. Aside from the VGF and CLF, the PPP Act will likewise allow government to shoulder more than 50% of a project’s cost, lifting the cap under the current BOT Law. Perks like exemptions from local and real property taxes will be institutionalized as well for the big-ticket projects of the oligarchs like power plants, toll roads and mass transport.

Aquino has actually already given these generous perks to the Ayala-Pangilinan consortium in the LRT 1 PPP deal. Of the total project cost of Php64.9 billion, Aquino agreed to shoulder Php34.9 billion or 54% of the total. Government share includes expenses for right of way acquisition, purchase of additional coaches, civil works and construction of depots. The Ayala-Pangilinan group also enjoys real property tax exemptions reportedly costing Php64 billion.

Through his PPP program, Aquino has successfully built a legacy of completely surrendering public interest and the people’s sovereignty to profit-driven corporate agenda. His term will be remembered for making the Sy, Pangilinan, Cojuangco, Ayala business groups and the foreign interests behind them more powerful and richer than ever.
Meanwhile, commuters are forced to endure trains that break down every week and greatly risk their safety even as fares jumped big time. Consumers are forced to bear rising water rates amid questionable charges. Households are forced to cope with steep electricity bills, manipulated charges, and insecure power supply.

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Consumer issues, Privatization

Maynilad says 65% of rate hike will be used to pay for its income tax

 

Manny Pangilinan and his foreign backers and financiers, who have interests in LRT, MRT and Maynilad, must be grinning widely right now.

With the public still reeling from the huge LRT/MRT fare hike, Maynilad Water Services Inc. announced that it will soon implement a significant increase in its basic charge. The average increase is P3.06 per cubic meter. What makes this rate hike as awfully unjust as the LRT/MRT fare hike is that 65% of the increase (about P1.99 per cu. m) will be used to recover the income tax of Maynilad. This was disclosed by the water firm’s Chief Finance Officer as quoted in a news report.

This means that hapless consumers will continue to pay for the corporate income tax of a highly profitable big business that has been cashing in on a basic service. In 2013, Maynilad reported a core income of P7.53 billion. (See chart below) Since 2010, its core income has been growing by more than 16% annually. Maynilad’s rising profits are mainly pushed by ever increasing water rates due to periodic and automatic adjustments allowed in its Concession Agreement with the Metropolitan Waterworks and Sewerage System (MWSS). Since taking over in 1997, Maynilad’s water rates have already ballooned by more than 500 percent. Since 2010, its all-in tariff (basic charge plus other charges) has jumped by more than 40 percent, which could further go up when the higher basic charge is implemented.

Image from Metro Pacific

Image from Metro Pacific (Core earnings represents earnings associated with business operations, and exclude earnings from goodwill, gains or losses from nonrecurring items, pension gains, legal settlements or employee stock options; source: Investopedia)

But while it has been earning billions of pesos from onerous and skyrocketing water rates, Maynilad wants to further milk the consumers dry by passing on their obligation to pay income tax to their customers. How does Maynilad justify this patently scandalous practice? A direct statement from its Chief Finance Officer: “Siyempre ang negosyante, ini-invest niya ‘yung pera niya para may return. So ang usapan dito, magkano ba ang tubo na dapat kitain ng pera na ‘yun. Importante ‘yung computation ng taxes kasi kailangan natin malaman magkano ‘yung net na iuuwi.”

To recall, the MWSS-Regulatory Office (RO) disallowed Maynilad and Manila Water Co. from including income tax recovery in their computation of the basic charge. Maynilad and Manila Water separately challenged the decision through arbitration led by the International Chamber of Commerce (ICC), a dispute resolution mechanism established by the Concession Agreement. Manila Water is still awaiting the result of its own arbitration case as of this posting.

More than eight million Maynilad customers are supposed to enjoy a reduction in their monthly water bill. In its decision last September 2013, the MWSS-RO ordered Maynilad to cut its basic charge by P1.46 per cu. m (which shall be distributed in five tranches at P0.29 per cu. m. per year) Now instead of a rollback, consumers are faced with a big rate increase. (Download the MWSS-RO resolution here)

The income tax is actually just one of the various issues raised by the MWSS-RO against Maynilad and Manila Water. Another is the P1 per cu. m. currency exchange rate adjustment (CERA), which the regulators ordered Maynilad to discontinue charging to its customers since a similar recovery mechanism – the foreign currency differential adjustment (FCDA), which recently also pushed water rates up – is already being imposed by Maynilad. But apparently, because of the arbitration, the CERA will remain in Maynilad’s water bill, and is now tucked in the basic charge.

Arbitration further exposes the privatization of MWSS, the region’s largest public-private partnership (PPP) deal in the water sector, as greatly anti-people and contrary to public interest. The Maynilad case clearly shows that effective public regulation is a sham in a program like PPP that is heavily biased to private corporate interests. The MWSS privatization was designed precisely to undermine government regulation as decisions are ultimately made by an arbitration panel where the concessionaire and a representative of foreign business interests have a say. ###

For background/additional information and discussion:

PNoy and the Big Water monopolies

Water arbitration: Issues and implications

Water rate hikes: Maynilad, Manila Water want P153B in future income tax passed on to consumers

Manila Water, Maynilad’s multi-million “pa-pogi” also charged to consumers

Maynilad, Manila Water ads further expose anti-consumer MWSS privatization

PH water rates among Asia’s highest

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