Category Archives: Human rights

Governance, Human rights

A weaponized justice system brings the worst injustices

On Mar 7, yet another wave of coordinated arrests and alleged extrajudicial killings struck the activist and cause-oriented groups in the country. According to media reports, nine were killed and six were arrested in simultaneous operations carried out by the Philippine National Police (PNP) in Southern Tagalog. The victims are activists from organizations of workers, urban poor, farmers and fishers, as well as from human rights groups based in Batangas, Cavite, Laguna and Rizal provinces.

This latest spate of attacks against activists came a mere nine weeks since the PNP launched a similar operation in Panay island. Nine people were killed and 17 were arrested by the police in several indigenous Tumandok communities on Dec 30, 2020. 

Common to both cases is the PNP claim that they were enforcing search warrants against the targeted activists for supposed illegal possession of firearms and explosives. Even more strikingly similar is that in both police operations, apparently the same judge issued the search warrants – Judge Jose Lorenzo R. Dela Rosa of Branch 4 of the Manila Regional Trial Court (RTC). (Note: in the Tumanduk case, another Manila RTC judge, Judge Carolina Icasiano Sison, was also named as behind the warrants.)

Less than two weeks prior to the Tumandok operations, the PNP also searched the houses of activists in Metro Manila and nabbed seven people on Dec 10, 2020. Again, the police secured search warrants for firearms and explosives to legitimize their operations. Providing the warrant was Judge Cecilyn Burgos-Villavert of the Quezon City RTC Branch 89. Villavert first gained notoriety for issuing the search warrants that led to the arrest of 57 individuals (including 15 minors aged 12 to 17) in Negros Occidental on Oct 31, 2019. 

Activists and communities in the island of Negros have been repeatedly targeted by joint police and military operations using court-issued search warrants as a cover. On Mar 30, 2019, state forces, in the process of enforcing 36 search warrants, killed 14 people and arrested 16 more in Negros Oriental. Just three months earlier, on Dec 27, 2018, six people were killed and 31 were arrested in simultaneous police operations in the same province. This time, the PNP was armed with more than 80 search warrants, according to reports. One judge sanctioned both Negros operations – Judge Soliver Peras of Branch 10 of the Cebu City RTC. 

The Duterte administration has blatantly weaponized the regional trial courts and included the legal system in its arsenal against activists and the marginalized communities and sectors they serve. When the justice system itself is weaponized to repress the people, the injustices committed become doubly abhorrent. Where else are people supposed to go to correct the wrongs made against them when those who are supposed to dispense justice are perceived as hoodlums themselves? 

The police and military template of taking in activists based on concocted lies and justified by dubious warrants has naturally led to ludicrous cases of arrests. In several instances, the arrested victims involve elderly women whom state forces laughably insist are in possession of explosives and firearms in her home, a household that usually includes young grandchildren. Even the United Nations Human Rights Office in a June 2020 report raised the alarm (in the context of Duterte’s equally vicious drug war) on how the Philippine police would “repeatedly recover guns bearing the same serial numbers from different victims in different locations” during their operations. 

For those killed during bloodstained police operations, even Duterte’s Justice department could no longer fully rationalize the “nanlaban”narrative (i.e., the victims resisted arrest and were killed by the police in the process). In a report to the UN Human Rights Council (UNHRC), the Justice department admitted that in more than half of the nanlaban cases they reviewed in the drug war, law enforcement agents did not follow protocol and no full examination of the recovered weapon was conducted. 

While the victims are involved in legitimate advocacies on the issues of land, labor, human rights, etc., they have been set up for state-perpetrated assaults through the non-stop red-tagging (labelling activists and their organizations as communists terrorists) by the regime. All these – the red-tagging, the use of courts to legitimize the raids on the houses and offices of activists, and the consequent killings and arrests, are part of the counterinsurgency campaign of Duterte. The made-up narrative is that the activists belong to the armed communist rebellion, thus the search warrants for firearms and explosives.

The UN Human Rights Office pointed out that that “the vilification of dissent and attacks against perceived critics are being increasingly institutionalized and normalized” in the country, as it noted how red-tagging “has posed a serious threat to civil society and freedom of expression”. It correctly argued that activists have become the targets of verbal and physical attacks, threats and legal harassment as “human rights advocacy is routinely equated with insurgency and the focus diverted to discrediting the messengers rather than examining the substance of the message.” 

What exactly is the substance of the message?

Some of those who were killed and arrested in the latest attacks in Southern Tagalog are workers and labor rights advocates. The minimum wage in the Calabarzon region (Cavite, Laguna, Batangas, Rizal and Quezon) is between PHP 317 and PHP 400, barely 20% of the estimated cost of living. Southern Tagalog workers and their supporters, as elsewhere in the country, have every reason to organize and struggle for their interests and rights, including on decent living. This is especially so under Duterte whose presidency is the worst in terms of addressing the issue of low wages.

Some of those who were killed and arrested are farmers, fishers and peasant rights advocates. With chronic landlessness and lack of government support, farmers suffer the worst poverty in the country. Based on data from the Philippine Statistics Authority (PSA), the poverty incidence among farmers is at 31.6% – the highest among all sectors, followed by fishers with 26.2 percent. Meanwhile, based on the official Census of Agriculture, as high as 62% of farmlands in Calabarzon in terms of area are not fully owned or controlled by the tillers. Farmers and peasant rights advocates in Southern Tagalog have every reason to organize and struggle for their right to land and life; especially so under Duterte who has openly instructed the police and military to shoot and kill farmers who are asserting such rights.

Like all the oppressed, the workers, farmers and people of Southern Tagalog do not only have the reasons to fight their oppression – they also have the legitimate right to do so. Indeed, no court warrant can arrest or kill the people’s collective right to resist injustice. ###

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Governance, Human rights

Junk Duterte’s terror bill

Terorista lang daw ang target ng anti-terrorism bill ni Duterte?

The farmers, the lumad – they are the biggest victims of terrorism, by the state. Duterte made the Philippine countryside the deadliest place in the world for farmers, indigenous people and the advocates of their rights.

In 2019, for instance, we ranked first in the list of countries with the highest number of monitored extrajudicial killings of farmers, farm workers, indigenous people, and land activists with 38 cases and 50 victims. That’s about one killing per week. Colombia, another country notorious for its political killings of rural people and activists, was a far second with 21 monitored cases and 27 victims.

Read the full report here: https://bit.ly/2MwguyF

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COVID-19, Governance, Human rights

PH has strictest lockdown in Asia, but ineffective vs. COVID-19

COVID-19 Strictest Lockdowns

If you feel that the COVID-19 lockdown being imposed by the Duterte regime is very strict, data say you are right. In fact, Duterte’s lockdown is the strictest in the region, even more rigid than that of his fellow authoritarian ruler Narendra Modi of India.

Compiling Google’s data on six categories of public mobility (retail and recreation; grocery stores and pharmacies; parks; transit stations; workplaces; and residential areas), the Nikkei Asian Review reported that the Philippines posted the largest average decline at 50.83 percent. With severe restrictions, the Duterte administration brought down public mobility by 85% in transit stations; by 79% in retail and recreation; and by 71% in workplaces. India ranked second with an average decline in public mobility by 47.83 percent.

But data also say these repressive lockdowns are not effective in the fight against COVID-19. While the Philippines and India are imposing very tight rules to restrict public mobility, they are still failing to bring down the number of new COVID-19 cases, which continue their upward trajectory after almost two months of lockdown.

On the contrary, countries that implemented less severe measures to control public mobility like Taiwan (2.16% decline in public mobility); South Korea (11.0%); Japan (13.83%); Vietnam (29.5%); and Thailand (31.66%) are significantly doing better in terms of bringing down the number of their daily new cases, as shown in the charts. (From EndCoronavirus.org)

Lockdowns are meant to hide the sorry state of public health systems and a convenient cover for leaders like Duterte (and Modi) to consolidate their authoritarian rule. The effective way to contain the spread of the new coronavirus are not repressive measures but reliable health and medical interventions, including testing.

Not surprisingly, there is an inverse correlation between testing and severity of lockdowns. Countries that conduct less tests tend to implement more severe lockdowns. India only conducts 1,042 tests per 1 million people while the Philippines conducts 1,379. Compare these figures to those countries that restricted public mobility less severely: Taiwan (2,790 tests per 1 million people); South Korea (12,773); Japan (1,502); Vietnam (2,681); and Thailand (3,264). (From Worldometer)

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COVID-19, Global issues, Human rights

PH prisons: Ticking COVID-19 time bombs

The Philippines has the world’s most overcrowded prisons, according to the World Prison Brief (WPB). In Asia, a region where jammed detention facilities are ticking #COVID19 time bombs, Philippine prison overcrowding is twice as worse as Bangladesh, the distant second in the region in terms of prison overcrowding.

At the Quezon City jail, which is almost 5x overfilled, nine inmates and nine staff members are COVID-19 positive. In a Mandaluyong jail, 19 inmates and a staff are COVID-19 positive. In Cebu City, two inmates are infected. To be sure, there could be more.

Worse, Duterte’s Martial Law-like implementation of anti-COVID-19 measures is further overcrowding prison facilities unnecessarily. In the 35 days of enhanced community quarantine (ECQ), the Philippine National Police (PNP) has arrested 31,363 people for violating government’s draconian lockdown rules.

Those arrested include urban poor who were demanding government aid; people who were forced to eke out a living despite the ECQ due to lack of government support; and even more outrageously, relief volunteers who were assisting poor communities cope with the crisis amid absence of government assistance.

The militarist mindset and approach of the Duterte regime are further exposing the public to greater danger. ###

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Governance, Human rights

The people are not afraid of you, Mr. President

 

COVID-19 protest

“WE’RE STARVING”. Residents of an urban poor community in Sitio San Roque in Quezon City trooped to EDSA on Apr. 1 amid strict lockdown rules due to COVID-19 to demand relief from government. (Photo: Yahoo! News)

President Duterte’s militarist response to the COVID-19 crisis took a turn for the worse on Tuesday, Apr. 1. In a televised address to the nation, he warned people seeking government relief amid the pandemic that he will “shoot them dead”. His unscheduled speech was apparently triggered by the protest of an urban poor community in Sitio San Roque demanding the government assistance promised to them when the capital region was put on enhanced community quarantine (ECQ).

The police arrested 21 of the protesting urban poor, adding to the more than 17,000 mostly poor people arrested nationwide for violating government’s lockdown policies. Compare the number of people arrested by the Philippine National Police (PNP) to the number of persons tested by the Department of Health (DOH) to combat COVID-19, which stood at just 3,938.

Filipinos have been enduring Duterte’s mindless and violent rants for four years now. But his latest incendiary rhetoric of ordering his police and soldiers to kill without hesitation those who violate his authoritarian ECQ hits differently for most. Locked down, deprived of mobility and productive work, starved and grappling with fear and uncertainty so much as with the unfamiliar virus as with government’s overall response to contain it, the people are enraged.

Duterte, as he is wont to do every time the legitimacy of his leadership is challenged, framed his virulent tirade as a warning to the Left, whose only desire according to the long ailing Chief Executive is to destabilize his government. He thought that this would justify his violent diatribe because the Left is supposedly an enemy of the state.

But the public felt it was not just addressed to the Left; or more likely they have already identified with the legitimate demands of the Left from this regime. Whichever is the case, Duterte is picking a fight not just against the politically organized sections of society, but all the people harshly impacted by the COVID-19 pandemic and government’s tyrannical response to a public health crisis.

The erstwhile apolitical, be they public personalities or one’s family and friends, are speaking up over Twitter or dinner against Duterte’s heartless verbal onslaught and its real implications to people’s welfare, especially those who are vulnerable to more hunger and poverty. The ECQ may have prevented public gatherings, but it also gave people more time online to discuss, share and process their collective thoughts and sentiments against the regime. It gave families and neighborhoods more time together to agree as a group how insufferable and contemptible the President and his men have become.

The ECQ meant to isolate the people from each other because of COVID-19 is ironically bringing more and more together in the conviction that the current state of the nation is no longer acceptable and tolerable. The people are not afraid of you, Mr. President. They are increasingly finding strength and courage from each other.

Duterte and his Defense and military people who are behind and in charge of the lockdown wrongly thought that their dastardly agenda of repressing dissent and democratic rights under the pretext of political stability has been made easier by the COVID-19 pandemic. On the contrary, the crisis and the government measures to supposedly address it in fact have heightened the conditions for greater social unrest and conflict, and for people to organize and take collective political actions.

The existing and emerging material conditions for these are unmistakable. Duterte’s own economic managers are forecasting an economic contraction of as much as 0.6% and job losses of as high as 1.8 million (one million in Luzon alone) this year due to the pandemic. Total economic losses could reach as much as PHP 1.36 trillion, with Luzon accounting for more than one trillion These estimates assume that the ECQ will only last for a month.

As the crisis is global, the economy could not rely on foreign exchange, including remittances from overseas Filipinos and foreign trade, to boost domestic consumption. The world economy may already be in a recession that some economists say is comparable in severity to the 2008-2009 Great Recession. Or it can even be worse. The International Labor Organization (ILO), for instance, estimates that the COVID-19 pandemic could wipe out up to 24.7 million jobs worldwide. For comparison, the global financial and economic crisis 10 years ago claimed 22 million jobs.

The National Economic and Development Authority (NEDA) expects remittances to drop by as much as PHP 8.5 billion this year due to the crisis. Many Filipino families will face hardship in the coming months, even long after the lockdown has been lifted. They include not just the urban and rural poor, who are the most exposed to the impacts of pandemics and economic declines, but even those who used to have the means to spend more. The pressure will further increase for government to provide social and economic services, something that the COVID-19 crisis has shown the regime is incapable of.

There is a disease spreading in government that is plunging the nation into chaos and death. It is not caused by the novel coronavirus, but by the old, familiar virus of authoritarianism. To get rid of this virus and heal as one, the country truly needs a bayanihan – to determinedly and strongly work together as a people in building a government and a nation that is truly theirs. In this battle, all the oppressed are frontliners.

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Governance, Human rights, Military & war

Rising national insecurity amid Duterte’s soaring security budget

 

Duterte with gun

Photo from Interaksyon

With Martial Law in Mindanao, a brutal drug war and an even more vicious counterinsurgency campaign, the Duterte regime vowed to make the country peaceful and safe. However, as once again highlighted by the recent twin bombings in Mindanao, it appears that instead of peace and quiet, the Duterte administration’s heavy-handed approach to national security is not only failing. Duterte’s policies are actually creating more conflict and insecurity for the people.

This even as Malacañang siphons off an ever-growing portion of public resources to its national security efforts, including for the controversial intelligence and confidential funds of the President and his security forces. In its 2020 budget proposal, the Duterte administration is seeking an all-time high of Php8.28 billion in total intel and confidential funds, on top of the hundreds of billions of pesos for the police and military establishments to acquire more arms and hire additional personnel.

Questionable, unjustifiable budget

Such big allocation for intel and confidential funds is questionable and unjustifiable for various reasons. One is that the funds are apparently not achieving their objectives. Aside from the bombings in Mindanao, the illegal drug trade has worsened even, as admitted by no less than Duterte himself. By abandoning the peace talks with the communist rebels and relying more on often bloody military and police operations in the countryside, Duterte is making the same mistakes of his predecessors of further feeding the 50-year old insurgency.

Another is that by their nature, intel and confidential funds are difficult to audit and are thus prone to corruption as has already happened many times in the past. Perhaps even more wicked than corruption is how these funds can be used to bankroll illegal and murderous operations against groups and people it considers as enemies of or threats to the regime.

It is indeed ironic that under a regime that has made anti-criminality and peace and order as its centerpiece program, the safety and security of the public are increasingly at risk. And this insecurity is coming not just from the unabated terrorist attacks and criminal activities that Duterte promised but failed to address, but from the very same policies of the regime that are supposedly meant to protect the people. Martial Law in Mindanao, rights advocates and even parliamentarians from the country’s ASEAN neighbors point out, has been a factor behind the terrible state of human rights under Duterte. Extrajudicial killings that mar Duterte’s drug war and counterinsurgency campaign are so prevalent that 8 out of 10 Filipinos fear that they or someone they know can be a victim anytime.

Mindanao bombings

The incidence of terrorist bombings in Mindanao has increased and has become more frequent under Duterte’s Martial Law. Just recently, two more incidents of bombing happened in the restive region. Last September 8, reportedly another suicide bomber staged an attack in a military camp in Indanan town in Sulu. A day before, at least seven people were hurt in an explosion in a public market in Isulan town in Sultan Kudarat.

This was the second time in four months that Indanan suffered an alleged suicide bombing. Just last June 28, an attack killed eight people (including the two suicide bombers) and wounded 12 more. The attack in Isulan was the second time in five months since a blast rocked a restaurant in the town on April 3, hurting 18 people. There are now five bombing incidents this year, with the deadliest occurring at a cathedral in Jolo, another town in Sulu, when a twin explosion killed 22 people and wounded at least 100 last January 27.

Counting the incidents since last year, there are now nine cases of reported terrorist bombings and explosions in Mindanao, killing 47 people and wounding more than 200. All these have happened under Martial Law, first imposed in May 2017, raising the question of whether or not military rule is really effective in curbing terrorism. (See Table)

Tab 1 Mindanao bombings

Still, Duterte officials continue to defend Martial Law in Mindanao despite the increased incidence of terrorist attacks. While crime incidents and proliferation of firearms in Mindanao have supposedly gone down because of Martial Law, authorities argue that “terrorism is really a different kind of thing”, leaving one to wonder what option more extreme is the regime contemplating to address terrorism. One answer could be the amendment to the Human Security Act (HSA), a priority legislation of Duterte that will make Martial Law nationwide and permanent.

Drugs and homicides

With increased incidence of terrorist bombings in Mindanao, claims by the regime of an improving peace and order environment become ever more doubtful. Widespread and systematic killings under the Duterte administration’s drug war and counterinsurgency campaign paint a picture of a deteriorating rule of law and of deepening impunity even as the Philippine National Police (PNP) maintains that the crime situation is getting better.

According to the PNP, for the entire 2018, there was a 9% decline in crime volume compared to 2017. From July 2016 to June 2018, the crime rate fell by 21.5% compared to July 2014 to June 2016, based on the police’s data. For the PNP leadership, there is an unmistakable correlation between crime and drug abuse. The reported trend of plunging crime volume continues in 2019, with Duterte officials congratulating the PNP for “making our streets safer and making our people feel secure.”

Sadly, many ordinary folk – in particular the victims of alleged extrajudicial killings (EJKs) and their families – do not feel the supposedly improved safety and security under the current regime. Official PNP figures show that the anti-drug operations have killed about 6,600 alleged drug pushers (mostly small-time street peddlers) and drug users from July 2016 to May 2019 (although even official figures are confusing – the latest PNP data being cited is 5,793 drug war killings between July 2016 and July 2019). Moreover, out of these thousands of deaths, a mere 253 police officers involved in the drug war killings have been criminally charged or faced an inquest proceedings. Majority of PNP operatives involved in these killings – 341 police officers – are facing only administrative charges.

Official data on the drug war are not just confusing; they are also not credible as they tend to understate the true extent of the killings. Counting the so-called homicides under investigation or suspected drug personalities killed by unidentified gunmen, there are now reportedly almost 23,000 deaths related to Duterte’s drug war, based on some estimates.

Activist killings

Meanwhile, bodies also continue to pile up under the equally notorious and ruthless counterinsurgency campaign of the Duterte administration. Based on the monitoring of human rights advocacy group Karapatan, there were 250 killed activists, leaders and members of cause-oriented groups from July 2016 to March 2019. Of the total, more than half – 134 killings – happened in Mindanao. (See Chart)

Tab 2 EJK victims by region

Most were from the peasant sector, indigenous people, and Moro as well as from the trade union and youth and student movements. Some were human rights lawyers, supportive local government officials, journalists, teachers and even priests. Perpetrators were usually unidentified gunmen, including those from declared anti-communist paramilitary groups. The aggressive and well-orchestrated propaganda campaign by the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP) and the PNP that the groups the victims belonged to are communist fronts is seen as justifying these violent attacks against unarmed civilians and critics of the regime.

Of particular concern recently is Negros Island, which is fast becoming a killing field for anti-communist hit squads and police operatives. Disguising as anti-criminality and anti-drugs operations, coordinated and systematic killings of civilians tagged as communist supporters have been gripping the island and have already claimed 116 victims between July 2016 and August 2019.

Thus, far from feeling secure, an overwhelming portion of the population are becoming more and more concerned about their personal safety amid the unabated EJKs. According to the latest survey (December 2018) of the Social Weather Stations (SWS), 78% of Filipinos are worried that they or anyone they know will be a victim of EJK. The results are even worse than the already high 73% recorded in June 2017.

Even foreigners see the Philippines under Duterte as one of the most dangerous places to live in the world. A 2019 survey of more than 20,000 expats ranked the Philippines as 14th out of 64 countries as most dangerous in terms of peacefulness, personal safety and political stability. In the same survey conducted in 2018, the Philippines ranked 11th out of 68 countries.

Intel funds for what?

In his 2020 budget proposal, Duterte is asking Congress to allocate a massive Php8.28 billion in intelligence and confidential funds for the executive branch, more than half of which (i.e. Php4.5 billion) will go directly to the Office of the President. The AFP and the Department of National Defense (DND) will have Php1.7 billion in intel funds while the PNP and the Department of Interior and Local Government (DILG) will get Php806 million.

Duterte’s (i.e., Office of the President and other executive agencies) 2020 intel and confidential budget is 49% higher than its level in the first Duterte proposed budget in 2017. From just Php5.57 billion in 2017, the intel and confidential funds of the Executive branch have jumped to an average of more than Php7.82 billion in the national budget from 2018 to the proposed 2020 budget.

Intel and confidential funds directly under the Office of the President are averaging Php3 billion per year (2017 to 2020) under Duterte, more than six times the annual average of his immediate predecessor Benigno Aquino III (2011 to 2016). (See Chart)

Tab 3 Average intel funds by president

But the increased intel and confidential funds of the President and of the police and military establishments does not guarantee that the rising terrorist bombings in Mindanao will be quelled. On the contrary, as Duterte’s surveillance funds increased, so has the frequency of terrorist attacks in Mindanao. Among other factors, this is the result of poor military and police intelligence and assessment, despite a huge boost in public funding.

Meanwhile, the illegal drug trade remains robust amid the bloody drug war of the administration and the campaign’s ballooning intel and confidential funds. Billions of pesos of illegal drugs continue to be smuggled into the country such as the Php11-billion worth of shabu that slipped past the customs and then mysteriously disappeared. Subsequent probes established that those who were in charge of customs intelligence, along with police officials, were involved in the smuggling of the enormous shabu shipment. Note that the estimated Php11-billion worth of missing shabu is already equivalent to almost half of the total worth of shabu that Duterte’s drug war has seized from July 2016 to March 2019; and it is just one shipment.

What’s even more disturbing is the very real possibility that intel and confidential funds are being used to bankroll not just shadowy but outright illegal activities that spell the death of thousands on the pretext of promoting national security and peace and order. The vigilante killings that target perceived enemies of the state, for instance, are so systematic that – coupled with Duterte’s notorious past as a longtime city mayor of endorsing, if not using, death squads to shortcut due process – it is not hard to believe that they are state-sponsored operations.

It is clear that Duterte is using the deteriorating situation on terrorism in Mindanao and illegal drugs and the resilient communist insurgency to justify an ever-growing unaccountable budget in the name of national security. In fact, it is using its own failures to sufficiently deal with the country’s national security issues not only to justify greater intel and confidential budget but to push for even more repressive measures. ###

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Agrarian reform, Human rights

Landlessness, poverty and war in Negros

“Kaya dun po sa amin
Di biro ang magtanim
Magpunla ka ng binhi
Punglo ang aanihin.”

(Magtanim ay di biro)

On Mar 30, 2019, the police and military killed 14 farmers in separate operations in the city of Canlaon and in the towns of Manjuyod and Sta. Catalina – all in Negros Oriental province. Twelve more were arrested. Police and military officials justified the killings and insisted that the victims were armed communist rebels. They claimed that state forces were just implementing search warrants for loose firearms when the victims opened fire at them.

But several witnesses, including relatives of the victims who survived the gruesome killings, have come forward to dispute the account of the police and military. The harrowing details of the massacre as told by the survivors and kin are being documented by human rights advocates and peasant groups as calls for justice and to end impunity mount.

War against peasants

The summary execution of 14 farmers in Negros Oriental came five months after unknown assailants massacred nine farmworkers in Sagay City in Negros Occidental on Oct 20, 2018. They were participating in a land occupation and cultivation campaign led by the National Federation of Sugar Workers (NFSW) at the disputed Hacienda Nene when they were killed. Weeks later, on Nov 7, 2018, their lawyer – a long-time peasant rights advocate in Negros – was also assassinated. For the military, the NFSW is a communist front.

It came three months after six people were killed and 15 arrested in similar joint police and military operations in search of supposed loose firearms in hinterland barangays in Negros Oriental on Dec 27, 2018. Again, the authorities insisted that the victims, including village officials, “turned out” to be armed communist rebels and fought back.

All in all under the Duterte administration, at least 55 farmers, farmworkers and land rights advocates have been felled by apparent extrajudicial killings in Negros island so far. These killings appear to be systemically being carried out as part of President Duterte’s anti-insurgency campaign, made even more reprehensible by his virulent rhetoric against assertive peasants (“My orders to the police and soldiers, shoot them… If they die, I do not care.” – Duterte on landless farmers involved in land occupation campaigns)

Negros island provinces are among those covered by Memorandum Order (MO) 32. It called for increased deployment of police and military forces purportedly to “suppress lawless violence and acts of terror”. The others are provinces in Samar island and Bicol region.

Implementation of the Malacañang directive in Negros island has taken the form of the Synchronized Enhanced Managing of Police Operations (SEMPO). More notoriously, it is also known as Oplan Sauron in Negros Oriental under whose name the recent mass killings and arrests of mostly Negrense peasants are being carried out.

Twenty of the reported 55 extrajudicial killings in Negros island were on account of Oplan Sauron in Negros Oriental. Oplan Sauron is sinister by design. Disguising as law enforcement, it uses search warrants for loose firearms to legitimize police and military attacks in rural communities and households suspected as bases of support of the New People’s Army (NPA).

But instead of weakening the NPA, such brutal modus operandi could be fueling even deeper collective resentment in the rural areas against the police and military. In the end, Oplan Sauron could only further boost the legitimacy of the people’s war and agrarian revolution that the NPA wages.

This is especially so because of the structural issues underlying the social unrest and conflict in Negros.

Landless, hungry, poor

Negros is an island mired in grinding poverty and hunger, mainly spawned by decades of chronic landlessness among its farmers and farmworkers.

Official poverty and hunger incidence in the island, especially Negros Oriental, is among the worst in the country. Negros Oriental has a poverty incidence of 45% (of population) compared to the national average of 21.6 percent. Its subsistence incidence is 24.2% while the national average is 8.1 percent. Negros Occidental has “better” poverty and hunger figures (29% and 9.4%, respectively) but these are still worse than the national averages. The numbers are as of 2015.

There are about 1.56 million poor people in the two Negros provinces. To give perspective, note that the country’s poorest region, the Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao (ARMM), has 1.99 million poor people spread in its five provinces.

To be sure, the actual levels of poverty and hunger in the Negros island are much higher than what official data indicate considering the absurdly low thresholds government uses to measure them. Based on the 2015 official poverty survey, for instance, a Negrense only needs Php39 to Php44 to meet daily food needs; and a total of Php56 to Php63 to meet daily food and non-food needs.

Nonetheless, such low standards still paint a picture of widespread destitution, one that is even worsening. Poverty in both Negros Oriental and Negros Occidental deteriorated from a decade ago (i.e. 2006 data). Hunger also worsened in Negros Oriental during the same period. (See Table 1)

Screen Shot 2019-04-07 at 4.10.42 PM

Many see government’s three-decade Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program (CARP) as a failure; and it can’t be more conspicuous anywhere else than in Negros island. CARP is supposed to distribute 427,656 hectares (has.) of land in the Negros region. But as of end-2016, the program has distributed just 302,377 has. for a balance of 125,279 has. in land acquisition and distribution (LAD).

Negros island accounts for 21% of the national LAD balance of 602,306 has. – the largest among all regions. It has the second lowest LAD accomplishment rate at 71% , just behind the 67% of another restive and impoverished region, the ARMM. (See Table 2)

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Meanwhile, a sizable portion of CARP lands in the region, particularly in Negros Occidental, is under the notorious stock distribution option (SDO) that allows landlords to retain effective control. SDO schemes cover more than 3,200 hectares of CARP lands in Negros Occidental as of June 2015 and practically all are planted to sugarcane, accounting for almost 90% of all SDO lands nationwide.

Indeed, most of the undistributed lands in Negros are vast sugarcane plantations concentrated in the hands of landlords that include political clans. After rice lands (about 23% of LAD balance), sugarcane lands (around 19%) comprise the largest portion of undistributed lands in the country, with an overwhelming concentration in Negros Occidental.

Thus, many of the landless in Negros end up as sugarcane farmworkers in these massive haciendas, trying to eke out a living under slave-like conditions. It is estimated that Negros island has about 335,000 sugarcane farmworkers, almost 43% of the national total.

Latest farm wages survey of government pegged the average nominal wage of sugarcane farmworkers at Php253.69 per day – the second lowest among major crops, just a bit better than corn farmworkers’ Php246.05.

But the actual take home pay of the sugarcane farmworkers is much lower as they are tied to the vicious cycle of landlessness, starvation wages and debt. Paying off loans used to buy rice and other basic daily necessities in between pay days leaves sugarcane farmworkers and their families with practically nothing. In reality, a sugarcane farmworker typically earns just around Php50 to 67 a day, forcing them to work in several haciendas to augment their income.

Their dire situation is only made worse by the dreaded tiempo muerto or the period between the planting and harvesting seasons of sugarcane where no work is available in the haciendas for three months. With no established mechanism of government support, sugarcane farmworkers are left to fend for themselves, usually by taking on odd jobs in the cities.

But others take organized action such as the bungkalan campaign (land occupation and collective cultivation) on still undistributed CARP lands. However, landlords and even state forces respond to this legitimate form of assertion of people’s rights to land and livelihood with systematic violence like what happened in the “Sagay 9” massacre.

When government’s apparent plan to end landlessness is to eliminate the landless, what are the farmers and farmworkers of Negros island supposed to do? ###

 

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Human rights

Who is afraid of IBON?

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(Photo: Politiko)

The only reason that Malacañang is going after groups like IBON Foundation is that because they have been very effective in exposing the lies of the Duterte government.

IBON has been effective in refuting the false claims of Duterte’s economic managers about the TRAIN Law, inflation, improving employment situation, benefits of Chinese loans, etc.

Instead of squarely and convincingly proving as false the fact-based criticisms of IBON or look at its concrete proposals to address the country’s economic woes, the Duterte administration resorts to malicious accusations.

For the past 40 years, IBON has established itself as a reliable source of progressive research and analysis on national socioeconomic issues. From Marcos to Duterte – IBON has been consistent in its position that economics should be about the people, their rights and interests.

But the Duterte administration obviously has zero tolerance for views and alternatives that contradict its policies and programs, including on the economy. Thus, it uses public resources not only to question the legitimacy of IBON but to apparently try to shut it down.

What Malacañang is doing is blatant repression. And while it targets the sources of funding support of IBON, the irresponsible act of the Duterte government also puts the officials and staff of IBON at risk of physical harm.

That is criminal and reprehensible. ###

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Governance, Human rights, Military & war

Militarizing development work: Army chief Rolando Bautista as DSWD head

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(Photo: The Philippine Star)

By appointing Army chief Rolando Bautista as the next DSWD Secretary, Pres. Duterte is transforming government’s social welfare and development work into one big Civilian Military Operations (CMO) for counterinsurgency.

This has serious implications, among others –

  1. It will undermine genuine development work. Already limited public resources intended for development will be further and more systematically diverted for military purposes. Gains will be measured not in development terms but whether target rebel groups have been weakened.
  2. Poor communities that require assistance will be held hostage by the military agenda as government assistance would be contingent not on their actual and urgent needs but on their support and cooperation with the military’s counterinsurgency campaign.
  3. It will make the job of civilian development workers more difficult and could even put them at risk as they will be seen as agents of the military, who many communities distrust because of their atrocities.

Thus, instead of development and peace, militarizing development work with Bautista’s appointment as DSWD chief will actually bring greater poverty and conflict. ###

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Governance, Human rights

Cha-cha ng mga trapo, dayuhan at negosyo

(Larawan mula sa CNN Philippines)

Ano ang problema sa Charter change (Cha-cha) ni President Duterte?

Dalawang bagay. Una, ang proseso kung paano gusto ng kampo ng Pangulo na baguhin ang konstitusyon. Pangalawa, ang mismong mga probisyon sa Saligang Batas na gusto nilang baguhin.

Sa unang punto, hindi lamang ito ang problemadong moda ng consituent assembly (con-ass) kundi maging ang paraan kung paano ito gustong ipatupad ng rehimen.

Totoong nakakabahala ang con-ass. Alam natin kung gaano kabulok ang Kongreso. Pugad ito ng mga pinakamasahol na trapo. Ipagkakatiwala ba natin sa kanila na kalikutin ang itinuturing natin na fundamental law of the land? Noong panahon ni Pres. Arroyo, malakas ang sigaw ng bayan laban sa Cha-cha at con-ass. Hindi umubra ang pakana ng mga trapo.

Pero ang mas nakakabahala ngayon ay ito –  mas garapal at mas bulok ang liderato ng mga trapong nagpapakana sa con-ass ni Duterte. Kung hindi n’yo pa nababalitaan, ito ang huling sinabi ni House Speaker Pantaleon Alvarez tungkol sa Cha-cha:

“Of course, some provinces would not support the initiative, then they will get zero budget. If you won’t go along with the plan, it’s okay. I respect that. It’s your right, but you should also respect my right to give you zero budget.”

Noong panahon nina GMA at Speaker Jose de Venecia, may pakulo pa ang mga trapo na “great debate” sa Cha-cha. Ngayon wala nang pakulo. Deretsahan na na pera-pera ang usapan. Kaninong pera ang iniyayabang ni Alvarez? Buwis natin. Buwis na lalo nilang pinabigat sa TRAIN (Tax Reform for Acceleration and Inclusion).

Mapapaisip ka tuloy – ang pahirap na dagdag-buwis ba ay para talaga sa infrastructure development at social services, o para sa Cha-cha ng mga trapo? Lalo ka tuloy masusuklam sa TRAIN. Pinabibigat lalo ang buhay ng mahihirap, pinagagaang ang sa mayaman para sa Cha-cha ng mga trapo? (Syempre, ang mga trapo ay sila rin ang mayayaman, at ang mga pinakamayaman ay mga backer ng trapo. Sila-sila rin ‘yan.)

Isipin n’yo, pera iyon ng mamamayan. Pinipiga sa bayang 10 milyon ang pamilyang nagsasabing mahirap sila at pitong milyong pamilya ang nagsasabing nakararanas sila ng gutom. Pero kung magsalita si Alvarez, parang galing sa sarili n’yang bulsa ang ipamumudmod sa mga gobernador at mayor na sasayaw sa Cha-cha.

Ito ang mga trapo na gustong mag-con-ass para baguhin ang ating Saligang Batas. Nagkakamali kayo kung inaakala n’yong tapos na ang maliligayang araw ng bulok na sistema ng pork barrel at patronage politics. Buhay na buhay ito sa ilalim ng Duterte administration at garapal na gagamitin para sa Cha-cha.

Lumilikha ng tensyon sa iba pang paksyon ng mga trapo ang kagaspangan ng pamamaraan ng mga ka-partido ng Pangulo sa House of Representatives. Para iratsada ang Cha-cha, joint voting ang con-ass na gusto nina Alvarez. Dito, magsasama bilang iisang assembly ang House at Senate para aprubahan ang mga pagbabago sa Konstitusyon sa botong three-fourths ng pinagsamang bilang ng dalawang kapulungan. Dehado syempre ang Senate na meron lamang 23 myembro sa House na merong 292.

Kung hindi payag ang Senate, sila-sila na lang daw sa House ang magku-con-ass, sabi ni Alvarez. Hinamon n’ya ang mga may kwestyon sa ganitong proseso na dumulog sa Supreme Court (SC). Ang parehong SC na inaatake nina Alvarez ng impeachment laban sa Chief Justice nito para kontrolado rin nila at maging sunud-sunuran sa agenda ng Malacañang.

Ito ang pangalawa (at mas mahalagang) punto, ano ang laman ng Cha-cha, para saan ito at para kanino?

Nakapaloob ang mga inihahaing pagbabago sa Saligang Batas sa Resolution of Both Houses (RBH) No. 8, ng Study Group ng Partido Demokratiko Pilipino-Lakas ng Bayan (PDP-Laban) Federalism Institute (executive summary), at ng binubuong mga panukala ng House committee on constitutional amendments.

Importanteng maintindihan ang Cha-cha bilang isa sa mga larangan ng pagtutunggalian ng iba’t ibang interes sa ating lipunan. Pangunahin dito ang pagtutunggali ng interes ng mga naghahari (dayuhan, pinakamayayamang negosyante’t landlords at kinatawan nilang malalaking trapo) at pinaghaharian (ordinaryong mamamayan, manggagawa, magsasaka, urban poor at iba pang mahihirap).

Noon pa, interes na ng mga dayuhan ang mas mahigpit na kontrol sa likas-yaman at ekonomya ng Pilipinas para higit nila itong mapagsamantalahan. Nagawa nila ito sa pamamagitan ng colonialization at globalization. Pero hindi nila maitodo nang husto dahil bawal sa Konstitusyon ang ganap na dayuhang pagmamay-ari sa ilang susing sektor ng ekonomya (kahit pa na madalas naiikutan).

Kaya ang Cha-cha para payagan ang foreign ownership/control sa lupa, public utilities, mass media, at iba pa ay matagal nang agenda ng mga dayuhan, lalo na ng US at mga negosyong Amerikano. Binubuhusan nila ng milyun-milyong dolyar ang mga pag-aaral at lobbying sa Kongreso para bigyan ng justification ang lalo pang liberalization ng ekonomya sa pamamagitan ng Cha-cha.

Para sa malalaking negosyo kabilang ang mga dayuhan, taliwas sa interes nila ang constitutional safeguards sa karapatang panlipunan at pang-ekonomya ng mamamayan. Kaya isa sa mga aatakehin sa Cha-cha ang mga ito gaya halimbawa ng consitutional provisions sa living wage, seguridad sa trabaho, makataong kondisyon sa paggawa, serbisyong panlipunan at iba pa.

Binabaluktot ang papel ng estado sa pagtiyak sa mga karapatang ito – kabilang ang epektibong state regulation sa mga negosyo sa ngalan ng national o public interest – habang binibigyang-diin kung paanong higit na makikinabang ang mga negosyo.

Iisa rin ang agenda ng mga trapong nagtutulak ng Cha-cha mula pa noong panahon nina Ramos, Erap at GMA – ang manatili sa poder at pahigpitin pa ang kapit sa kapangyarihan ng mga nasa pwesto. Hindi ito nagbabago hanggang ngayon kay Duterte. Ang kaibahan, bukod sa mas agresibo at mas garapal ang mga trapo, mas tampok ang tunguhing diktadura ng Cha-cha ngayon.

Kinukonsentra ng Cha-cha nina Duterte at Alvarez ang kapangyarihan sa kamay ng iisang paksyon ng mga trapo habang pinahihina ang mga kalabang paksyon. Itinatago ito sa federalism bilang porma ng gobyerno. Pero kung susuriin, makikita ang authoritarian agenda at konsolidasyon ng poder ng nakaupong rehimen sa panahon ng mahabang transition sa federalism (na diumano ay pwedeng umabot sa 10 taon). Ito ang parehong istilong bulok ng diktadurang Marcos noon.

Kabilang sa mga panukalang inihahain ang abolisyon ng Kongreso at pagbibigay ng kapangyarihan kay Duterte na bumuo ng mga batas; pag-abolish sa opisina ng Bise Presidente, ang pagkontrol sa mga constitutional commission; at maging ang posibilidad ng pagtatalaga ng mga bagong myembro ng judiciary. Kung matutuloy ang maitim na planong ito, kumpleto at absoluto ang magiging kontrol ni Duterte sa lahat ng branches ng gobyerno.

Kung tunggalian ng mga interes ang Cha-cha, ang nagtutunggali sa pangunahin ay ang interes ng naghahari at pinaghaharian. Pero sa mga paksyon ng naghahari, mayroon ding tunggalian. At lalo itong matingkad sa diktadurang agenda ng paksyon nina Duterte. Kayan naman matigas ang pagtutol ng Senado sa gusto nina Alvarez na joint voting sa con-ass. Ito rin ang posibleng dahilan ng preference ng ilang ng malalaking negosyo sa constitutional convention (con-con), at hindi con-ass, bilang moda ng Cha-cha.

Pero iisa ang pinagkakasunduan ng buong naghaharing uri ng malalaking negosyo, dayuhan at trapo – lalong supilin ang mga karapatan ng kanilang mga pinaghaharian at lalo silang pagsamantalahan. #

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